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Fernanda G. Nicola*
ABSTRACT
The recurrent claim made by judges, scholars, and lawyers
shaping the debate on European private law is that there is a
constitutional asymmetry in the European Union (EU). The
asymmetry lies in the fact that European Community competences
mostly encompass market and economic matters at the expense of
social issues, while Member States have full jurisdiction over social
matters but only limited jurisdiction over economic matters. Thus,
the European constitutional structure leads to a market/technocratic
orientation in its supranational institutions, as opposed to the
social/political orientation of Member State governments. The
pervasiveness of this claim allows jurists critiquing European
adjudication from both the Right and the Left to systematically
claim that the European Court of Justice lacks democratic
legitimacy to adjudicate particular cases on European contract or
torts rules. Recently, European scholars, lawyers, and judges have
departed from constitutional asymmetry claims. This article
demonstrates that there are several factors that have played an
important role in undermining the credibility of the constitutional
asymmetry claim. First, the emergence of a well-established
scholarship in European private law has raised awareness among
academics and lawyers regarding the complexities of the process of
harmonization of private law. Second, in light of a transatlantic
legal dialogue, European jurists have increasingly received law and
economics from the United States in a context that has been
hermeneutically rich but increasingly ideologically divided. While
the Right and mostly neoliberal scholars welcomed United States
law and economics, the Left rejected it and promoted a social
justice agenda for the internal market. Such selective reception of
U.S. legal thought contributed to the radicalization of the debate
over European private law. Ultimately, with the establishment of a
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European private law scholarship and the emergence of new
academic debates, which are increasingly ideologically divided,
lawyers and scholars are frequently departing from constitutional
asymmetry claims; instead, they are evaluating the consequences
the European Court of Justice’s decisions on their own terms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article elucidates some of the changes that have taken place
over the last decade in the way lawyers, judges, and scholars address the
question of harmonizing contracts and torts rules in European private
law. Methodologically, I depart from a timeworn comparative
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technique of emphasizing differences and similarities between rules,
doctrines, and schools of thought in Europe and the United States. 1 A
classic example of such a comparative technique is the claim that
European lawyers are still formalist because American Legal Realism
did not take place in Europe or because European jurists did not
experience the ideological and political shifts that took place in the
United States over judicial federalism. 2 Rather, I concentrate on the
ideological differences among various groups of lawyers and scholars in
the debate on European private law and the function that their particular
claims play regarding the democratic legitimacy of the European
Judiciary and the neoliberal bias of European integration. In particular,
I focus on judicial law making by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
and the role of legal scholarship in shaping the discourse on the
formation of European private law. 3 My claim is that European private
* Assistant Professor, Washington College of Law, American University. SJD Candidate,
Harvard Law School and PhD in Comparative Law, University of Trento, Italy. I am greatly
indebted to the following individuals for the opportunity to discuss this work in depth: Daniela
Caruso, Duncan Kennedy, Michele Graziadei, Christian Joerges, and Jerry Frug. I would like to
thank Jane Bestor, Jonathan Baker, Isabel Jaramillo, Janet Halley, Ugo Mattei, Anna di Robilant,
Brishen Rogers, Teemu Ruskola, Ann Shalleck, David Snyder, and the junior faculty workshop at
the Washington College of Law for their thoughtful comments on this paper. I am greatly
indebted to Stephanie Humphries and Ulric Lewen for their invaluable help on this piece. Errors
are mine only.
1 See Mathias W. Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002) (providing an account of the
limitations and stagnations in the realm of European private law).
2 See Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought:
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 295
(2008) (discussing the absence of legal realism in Germany). Though expressing divergent
political views on the “new federalism” of the Rehnquist Court, scholars have emphasized that its
agenda is not committed to an intellectually consistent version of federalism. Rather, depending
on the circumstances of the various cases, the Court might or might not favor state rights at the
expense of the federal government, or vice versa. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique Of
The New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths
of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). As to the judicial
federalism argument, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dominant mode of legal reasoning and its view
on federalism have shifted several times over the course of the Twentieth Century. By
internalizing the lesson of American Legal Realism, jurists no longer make false associations by
collapsing institutional competence arguments (federal vs. state; courts vs. legislatures) with
substantive values (free market vs. social concerns; efficiency vs. equitable distribution). In fact,
when a U.S. lawyer addresses the U.S. Supreme Court he does not argue that its judicial lawmaking will favor free market values rather than social concerns. In contrast, until recently
European lawyers argued that the European Court of Justice favored free market or efficiency
rationales rather than social and redistributive goals. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING (1948); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 2000).
3 For similar approaches, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Critica dell’ideologia e analisi antagonista: il
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law has changed over time through the establishment of an EU-wide
private law scholarship. This scholarship, in turn, has been advanced by
a number of politically divided groups of scholars who have selectively
received United States law and economics in a context that has been
hermeneutically rich but increasingly ideologically divided. 4 This
selective reception of United States law and economics has contributed
to a radical change in the views of scholars who are involved in the
debate on European private law. An example of such a change is the
use of the “subsidiarity” argument, 5 which over time has been adopted
by diverse groups to achieve opposite political outcomes. 6 Initially,
scholars on the progressive side of the spectrum cited the principle of
subsidiarity to resist harmonization of private law and to protect
national private laws. 7 Later, scholars on the conservative side of the
spectrum deployed the subsidiarity principle to advocate for regulatory
competition and diversity of legal rules rather than the adoption of a
European civil code. 8
Recently, some scholars have claimed that the “lack of success of
pensiero di Marx e le strategie giuridiche della comparazione,18 RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO
PRIVATO 703 (2000) (It.) [Critique of Ideology and Antagonistic Analysis: Marxism and the
Legal Strategies of Comparative Law, CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRIVATE RIGHTS]. See also Amr
Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative Law in the Arab World, in
RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152, 152-189 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001);
Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property,
10 EUR. L.J. 751, 762 (2004).
4 See DIEGO LOPEZ MEDINA, TEORIA IMPURA DEL DERECHO (2004) [IMPURE
THEORY OF LAW].
5 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 5 (ex art. 3b) (as amended by
Maastricht in 1992) (using a procedural approach to determining issues of subsidiarity, rather
than substantive criteria, and stating that “[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive
Competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community”). See also George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity
Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
332, 334 (1994) (analyzing “the apparent contradiction between subsidiarity’s high claims and its
relatively low esteem”).
6 For an analysis of the structure of legal arguments, see Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of
Legal Argument, 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 75 (1991); The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28
Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685 (1976). See also David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32
N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 335 (2000) (discussing the professional vocabulary international
lawyers use to debate reform, how one set of ideas gains dominance, and renewal in the field).
7 See Hugh Collins, European Private Law and Cultural Identity of States, 3 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE. L. 353 (1995).
8 See Roger Van den Bergh, Forced Harmonisation of Contract Law in Europe: Not to Be
Continued, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 249 (Stefan
Grundmann & Jules Stuyck, eds., 2002).
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the economic analysis of law in Europe to date can be traced to
characteristics of European culture, legal systems, and the European
legal academy.” 9 In contrast, this article demonstrates that scholars,
lawyers, and judges have incorporated law and economics in the debate
on European private law, but in a selective fashion. 10 This article shows
that during the formation of European private law and its body of
scholarship, a dialogue among lawyers, scholars, and judges, across the
Atlantic has deeply influenced the current European legal thinking.
Part II analyzes the creation of European private law when the
European Commission (EC or “Commission”) first began harmonizing
contract and tort rules by way of European directives in the mid-1980s,
which the ECJ then was called on to interpret in the 1990s. These
judgments created a sort of federal common law in Europe, 11 which
sparked much criticism among jurists and created what I call a
“legitimation puzzle.” 12 Specifically, European jurists on both sides of
the political spectrum frequently attacked the ECJ, stating that it lacked
the institutional competence to adjudicate cases interpreting European
private law directives. 13 In commenting on ECJ adjudication, these
jurists often conflated institutional competence arguments (European
level versus Member State level) with substantive value arguments
(efficiency versus equitable distribution; free market versus social
goals), assuming that the ECJ was committed to free market and
efficiency values whereas courts of the Member States were committed
to social and redistributive goals. The conflation of institutional
competence and substantive value arguments was directly connected to
9 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Economic Analysis
of Law in the United States and in Europe, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 602, 616 (2006). See also
Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 277 (1991). But see Ugo Mattei & Roberto Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law
Countries: A Comparative Approach, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 265-66 (1991).
10 This section explains why jurists on the Right have adopted mainstream law and economics
theories while jurists on the Left have rejected the entire discipline, including its mainstream,
liberal, and critical approaches. For an account of the reception of legal theories and ideologies in
different hermeneutical contexts, see MEDINA, supra note 4.
11 See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, Federal Common Law in the European Union: A
Comparative Perspective From The United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2006).
12 The legitimation puzzle relates to the way in which lawyers attempt to sharply distinguish
law from ideology because they believe that the former offers a more just and natural worldview
than the latter. See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 236-37.
13 See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L210) 29 (EC) [hereinafter Products Liability
Directive] (on the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the
Member States concerning liability for defective products); Council Directive 90/314, 1990 O.J.
(L158) 59 (EC) [hereinafter Package Travel Directive]. See also Mathias Reimann, Product
Liability in a Global Context: The Hollow Victory of the European Model, 11 EUR. REV. PRIVATE
L. 128 (2003) (providing a comparative analysis of the Products Liability Directive).
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the argument about “constitutional asymmetry” in the EU. Rather than
evaluating the consequences of each case on its merits, European jurists
were constantly adopting constitutional asymmetry arguments to
delegitimize ECJ law making and question the democracy of the
European legal architecture as well as its neoliberal economic policies.
The legitimation puzzle shows how critics despite opposing claims and
diverging political beliefs agreed that the ECJ was not a democratically
legitimate forum to decide social reforms or efficiency questions
specific to the private law regimes of each Member State.
Part III recasts the process of harmonization of private law within
the larger politics of economic integration. It discusses the continuing
tension between the European level and Member States during two
alternative phases: negative and positive integration. 14 Further, it shows
how legal scholars, judges, and lawyers have contributed significantly
to the process of European integration by creating a new European
professional vocabulary. 15 This part shows how some of the most
influential social scientists making “constitutional asymmetry” claims
were on the one hand warning about the increasing democratic deficit
and the neoliberal trend affecting European institutions while at the
same time “Europeanizing” domestic and national debates. Instead of
highlighting the different types of local resistance to integration by
national bureaucracies or local elites, the constitutional asymmetry
claim successfully shifted the debate from a domestic level to a
European level. 16
Part IV examines the harmonization of private law from the
perspective of a European-wide legal scholarship, which is increasingly
politically divided. The scholarly debate has been characterized by
14
15

See FRITZ SHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 43 (1999).
See PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 72-73 (1984); PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE
NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE FIELD OF POWER 264 (Lauretta C. Clough trans., Stanford
Univ. Press 1996) (1989):
The field of power is a field of forces structurally determined by the state of the
relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of capital. It is also,
and inseparably, a field of power struggles among the holders of different forms of
power, a gaming space in which those agents and institutions possessing enough
specific capital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be able to occupy the
dominant positions within their respective fields confront each other using strategies
aimed at preserving or transforming these relations of power.
16 For local resistance to European integration, see Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the
Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L.J. 3 (1997);
Henry G. Schermers, Comment on Weiler’s The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2525,
2527 (1991). On the shift from the national to the international and how a depolitization effect is
intrinsic in such a move, see David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN J. INT’L L. 1
(1994).
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three different phases where, over time, opposing elites, consisting of
lawyers and scholars, have departed from constitutional asymmetry
claims. This approach to the European scholarly debate shows how
jurists have deployed similar policy arguments and, often, constitutional
asymmetry claims in support of opposing normative aspirations. 17
Scholars on the Right and the Left have radically shifted their positions
in favor or against harmonization of private law during this time.
However, today there are two main opposing groups: neoliberal lawyers
advocating for an efficient common market and greater regulatory
competition and welfarist lawyers advocating for greater social justice
and a European civil code for private law.
Part V offers a further explanation of why European scholars,
lawyers, and judges have departed from making constitutional
asymmetry claims. In the last decade, European jurists increasingly
have participated in a transatlantic debate by selectively receiving
United States law and economics in a hermeneutically rich context. 18
However, while neoliberal scholars have welcomed mainstream United
States law and economics, social justice advocates have in large part
rejected it, even the more progressive version that addresses distributive
concerns. This selective reception of U.S. law and economics by
European lawyers has had two results. First, it has contributed to the
radicalization of the debate on the harmonization of private law.
Second, it has obliged lawyers, scholars, and judges to depart from
making constitutional asymmetry claims to instead evaluate the
efficiency and distributive consequences of each European private law
rule.
II. COURTS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
A. From European Integration to the Harmonization of Private Law
The creation of a European private law is conceptually problematic
for jurists who traditionally understand private law as those provisions
enshrined in continental civil codes that regulate contract, tort, and
property law and later on included consumer, landlord and tenant, and
labor law provisions. 19 Therefore, European lawyers tend to consider
this more or less coherent body of private law rules as inherently
17
18
19

For an analysis of the structure of legal arguments, see sources cited supra note 6.
See MEDINA, supra note 4, at Prologo XIV.
See FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE, WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO GERMANY (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
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controlled by national governments and interpreted by domestic
courts. 20 However, due to the prominent role of the European
Community in adopting and interpreting directives aimed at modifying
private law rules, this belief has radically changed in the last twenty
years. Today jurists are obliged to re-conceptualize conventional legal
categories in order to address the changing notion of European private
law.
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht adopted EC Treaty art. 95 that
gave the Community the power to harmonize national legislation only if
it contributes to the establishment and functioning of the internal
market. Similar to the Commerce Clause in the United States, this
provision gives the Community relatively broad powers to issue
directives and to harmonize specific private law rules. 21 In the late
1950s, however, it was not clear which instruments the Community
could use to create the internal market and implement the four freedoms
(free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons). 22 By the
1960s, the ECJ began “constitutionalizing” the Treaty. Through the
adoption of the doctrines of supremacy of EC law and direct effect, the
Court exercised strict scrutiny over the implementation of EC law by
the Member States. 23 For many commentators, the Court became the
20 On the understanding of “private law” as a coherent body, see Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts
on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private Law, in THE POLITICS OF A
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Martjin Hesselink ed., 2006).
21 The term “harmonization,” or approximation, of the laws was introduced in the original
Treaty of Rome (1958) under article 100 (now EC Treaty art. 94) with the goal of eliminating the
distortions of competition created by the laws of the Member States. The Single European Act
(1987) adopted article 100A (now EC Treaty art. 95) that required majority voting rather than
unanimity to achieve the approximation of national measures for the establishment and
functioning of the common market. In contrast, under EC Treaty art. 95, the Council decides via
majority voting through a co-decision procedure. See Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 251 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (stating that the
European Council and the European Parliament share equal powers), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf; see also Walter van
Gerven, Harmonization of Private Law: Do We Need It?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 505, (2004).
22 See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 10
(2004):
The creation of a common market lies at the heart of the EU. Article 2 says that the
Community has as its task the establishment of a common market, and one of the
activities of the Community listed in Article 3 is the creation of ‘an internal market
characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.’
23 With the doctrine of Direct Effect the ECJ has confirmed that the Treaty, as well as
Regulations and in certain cases European directives, directly confer individual rights to persons
who can enforce those rights before their domestic court. See Case 26/62, Van Gend v.
Netherlands, 1963 E.C.R. 00095; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Electrica,
1964 E.C.R. 585.
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engine of market integration, acting as a quasi-federal judiciary. 24
Through vertical judicial review, the ECJ struck down national laws that
conflicted with EC law because they created an impediment to the free
movement of goods between Member States. 25 By the 1990s, it became
clear that EC law, encompassing free movement and competition law,
as interpreted by the ECJ was the instrument par excellence of market
integration. 26
Unlike the United States, the EU did not create a system of federal
courts. Thus, what is largely understood as European private law results
from the complex interplay between harmonizing directives and
national private law regimes. The process of private law harmonization
encompasses a large number of legal formants, or legal sources, and
institutional actors both at the European and at the national level. 27
European private law comprises a variety of legal rules, which derive
from legislative, judicial, and scholarly sources operating at different
levels of government. 28 The legislative formant of European private
law comprises both the body of EC legislation, namely directives that
since the mid-1980s created a patchwork harmonization of private law
rules, and national legal rules enshrined in continental civil codes and
Member States’ own legal traditions interpreting those laws. 29
Therefore, European private law also encompasses those legal
24

See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991). The
question of whether Europe is a federation or something else has been the object of studies on
integration through law since the late 1970s. See 1:1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE
AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et. al. eds., 1986). However,
during the 1990s, the dominant political science vocabulary addressed the EU as a polity less
integrated than a federation but more integrated than a custom union, namely a “multi-level
system of governance”—a polity composed of multiple layers of government in which power is
diffused across the different levels rather than hierarchically imposed. See LIESBET HOOGHE &
GARY MARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001);
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Gary Marks et. al. eds., 1996); Gary Marks, Liesbet
Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multilevel
Governance, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUDS. 341 (1996). However, to simplify some aspects of the
comparison with the United States, this article uses the term “federal.”
25 See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 00873, para. 5 (citing the
broad formula deployed by the ECJ: “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to
be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”).
26 See generally MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT (2000); REIN WESSELING, THE
MODERNIZATION OF EC ANTITRUST LAW (2000).
27 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (1991); RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO (5th ed.1992).
28 See P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 531 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
29 See Reiner Schultze, European Private Law and Existing EC Law, 13 Eur. Rev. Private. L.
3, 4 (2005).
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provisions that Member States have introduced into their pre-existent
civil codes in order to transpose European directives.
In response to the democratic concerns raised by policy-makers
and academics, the Commission in 2001 consulted with stakeholders
likely to be affected by European contract law to determine whether to
continue adopting consumer protection directives and soft law
instruments or whether to adopt a more comprehensive European
contract code. 30 In February 2003, the European Commission published
an Action Plan aimed at achieving greater coherence in European
contract law. 31 The Action Plan reflects the concerns raised by
stakeholders and academics, and it attempts to resolve the practical and
technical problems arising from the divergence of national contract law
regimes. 32 By targeting the obstacles that prevent the ‘smooth
functioning’ of the internal market, the Action Plan aspired to improve
the quality of Community regulation through legislative transparency
and stakeholders’ participation.
In the Action Plan, the Commission addresses contract law but
appears uncertain about which tools to employ; for example, whether to
use hard or soft measures or sectoral or comprehensive initiatives to
achieve its goal of an efficient and coherent regulation of contract law.
In departing from a European codification, the Action Plan ameliorates
the existent contract acquis. 33 It does so by improving coherence
through both a hard measure and a soft one, in particular the nonbinding Common Frame of Reference (CFR). 34 Similar to the
Restatement of Contracts in the U.S., the CFR aims to increase
coherence of European contract law and to achieve the uniform
application of directives. But the Commission carefully avoids the term
30

See Commission of the Eur. Communities, Communication from Commission to the
Council & the European Parliament on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final (Nov. 7
2001) [hereinafter Com. on Contract Law].
31 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament and Council – A More Coherent European Contract Law – An Action
Plan, COM (2003) 68 final (Dec. 2 2003) [hereinafter Action Plan].
32 See Com. on Contract Law, supra note 30; see also Dirk Staudemayer, The Commission
Action Plan on European Contract Law, 2 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L. 113 (2003).
33 The acquis communataire in a particular legal field encompasses all EC law sources
stemming from the treaty, community acts (regulations, directives, or communications), and case
law from the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI). See, infra note 116; Action Plan, supra
note 31.
34 See Action Plan, supra note 31 para. 77 (addressing consolidation, codification, and the
existing instruments as possible means to achieve greater coherence). “Codification means the
adoption of a new legal instrument which brings together in a single text, but without changing
the substance, a previous instrument and it successive amendments, with the new instrument
replacing the old one and repealing it.” Id. at n.56.
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“code” and instead adopts the softer notion of CFR. This non-binding
codification aims to provide common principles, terminology, and rules
for contract law in order to address gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in
the application of European contract law. 35
According to the Commission, the obstacles arising from the nonuniform implementation of directives by Member States leads to
inconsistencies and fragmentation of contract regimes, creating different
legal rules for the same commercial situation. 36 The Commission
maintains that a non-uniform application of contract rules entails high
transaction costs, which burden both industries and ‘active’ consumers
in search of precious information. 37 High transaction costs emerge not
only in the formation of cross-border contracts, but also through judicial
control over the fairness of contractual terms. 38 In order to achieve
greater coherence in the application of European contract law, and
consequently reduce transaction costs, the Commission’s strictly
functionalist approach aims to improve the quality of the existing
European legislation and case law. In short, the Action Plan reinforces
the view that the existence of different contract law regimes creates a
barrier to trade and cross-border transactions within the internal EU
market. Thus, coherence means more efficient outcomes, which can be
reached through more uniform implementation and maximal
harmonization. 39
In response to the Action Plan, the European Parliament (EP) also
recognized the need for further harmonization in order to facilitate
cross-border transactions within the internal market. 40 Even though the
35

See id. at paras. 55-68.
[T]he Commission will seek to increase, where necessary and possible, coherence
between instruments, which are part of the EC contract law acquis, both in their
drafting and in their implementation and application. Proposals will, where
appropriate, take into account a common frame of reference, which the Commission
intends to elaborate via research and with the help of all interested parties. This
common frame of reference should provide for best solutions in terms of common
terminology and rules . . . .
Id. at Executive Summary.
36 See id. paras.16-24, 57. See also Rodolfo Sacco, L’Interpret et la Regle de Droit
Europeenne, in LES MULTIPLES LANGUES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN UNIFORME 226, 226−38
(Rodolfo Sacco & Luca Castellani eds., 1999).
37 See Action Plan, supra note 31, paras. 25−51.
38 See id. paras. 34-36. For example, more information is necessary for different national
mandatory rules limiting or excluding contractual liability.
39 See id. para. 57 (“An improved acquis should enhance the uniform application of
Community law as well as facilitate the smooth functioning of cross-border transactions, and,
thereby, the completion of the internal market.”).
40 See id. The EP argues that new harmonizing directives on contract law should be based on
EC Treaty art. 95, and, in the aftermath of the Tobacco Advertising judgment (infra note 83), their
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EP offered its political guidance in order to encourage further
Europeanization of contract law, it warned the Commission not to
overstep the boundaries of Community competences. 41 Supranational
institutions, such as the Commission, the Council, and the European
Parliament, are particularly concerned that EC Treaty art. 5 and the
principle of attributed competences of the Community are respected.
B. Conflciting Views on the “Federal Common Law”: Constitutional
Assymetry in the Eurpoean Union
Once the European Commission adopts the same directives that the
ECJ has in the last ten years, it will exercise the role of the uniform
interpreter of Community law, thus creating a federal common law for
Europe. This Part addresses products liability litigation through
numerous decisions by the ECJ on the non-conformity of national laws
with the Products Liability Directive, focusing on the different reactions
by two groups of scholars to the ECJ judgments interpreting the Product
Liability Directive and the Travel Package Directive. The section
emphasizes that, despite their conflicting political views and normative
aspirations on private law, both groups of lawyers deploy similar
arguments to criticize ECJ adjudication. They both claim, for different
reasons, that rather than having the ECJ decide crucial distributive
questions through private law adjudication, such decisions should be
made by democratically elected national legislatures.
In Gonzaléz Sánchez, a Spanish citizen brought a claim under
Spanish law seeking compensation for injuries suffered as the result of a
blood transfusion during which she was infected with Hepatitis C. The
defendant, Medicina Asturiana, who owned the medical premises where
the transfusion took place, challenged the applicability of the national
provisions in light of a subsequent national law that transposed the
Product Liability Directive. 42 The national court concluded that the
rights conferred to consumers were more extensive under the Spanish
law invoked by the plaintiff than under the law transposing the
directive. 43 Through a preliminary question, the Spanish tribunal
referred the matter to the ECJ to determine whether, under Article 13 of
primary goal should be to establish and promote the internal market.
41 See Staudemayer, supra note 32, at 116-17.
42 See Products Liability Directive, supra note 13.
43 See Case C-183/00, González Sanchéz v. Medicina Asturiana SA, C-183/00 judgment,
2002 E.C.R. I-03901 [hereinafter González]; C-183-00, González v. Medicina Asturiana SA,
Opinion of the A.G. Geelhoed, 2002 E.C.R. I-03827, at paras.16−19 [hereinafter A.G. Opinion]
(explaining the difference between the regime under Spanish law and the regime set up by the
Products Liability Directive).
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the Product Liability Directive, the rights conferred under national
legislation to plaintiffs in defective product cases were to be restricted
or limited as a result of the transposition of the Directive into domestic
law. 44
The Spanish government and the Commission supported the
defendant’s argument, asserting that the purpose of the Product Liability
Directive was to harmonize the laws of the Member States. They
argued that Article 13 of the directive did not allow Member States to
maintain a liability regime that was more favorable to plaintiffs than the
one provided by the Directive. 45
Agreeing with the plaintiff, the Greek, French, and Austrian
governments advocated the opposite interpretation of the Product
Liability Directive provision. They argued that because the Directive
was an incomplete measure, it allowed Member States to exercise their
discretion in adopting a liability standard more favorable to the plaintiff.
Relying on the EC consumer protection title enshrined in EC Treaty art.
153, the governments claimed that the Directive entailed only minimal
harmonization, which did not preempt Member States’ laws. They
asserted that the Community was committed to guaranteeing a
minimum threshold of protection, while allowing Member States to
maintain or adopt more stringent protective measures. 46
The ECJ held that “Article 13 of the Directive cannot be
interpreted as giving the Member States the possibility of maintaining a
general system of product liability different from that provided for in
the Directive.” 47 The opinion of Advocate General (A.G.) Geelhoed
recalled the history of the Directive and the fact that the negotiation
process was difficult due to the high political stakes involved for both
businesses and consumers. In contrast to EC Treaty art. 95, which
comprises the legal basis of the Directive and was unanimously adopted

44
45

See González, para. 13.
Id. paras. 19, 33−34. Such interpretation would create barriers to trade for the functioning
of the internal market.
46 Id. paras. 21-28. The Court relied on three arguments addressing the purpose, the wording,
and the structure of the directive. First, the ECJ clarified that the purpose of the directive was to
“ensure undistorted competition between traders, to facilitate free movement of goods and to
avoid differences in levels of consumer protection.” Id. para. 26. Second, in addressing the text
of the directive the Court highlighted that “the Directive contains no provision expressly
authorizing the Member States to adopt or maintain more stringent provisions in matters in
respect of which it makes provision, in order to secure a higher level of consumer protection.” Id.
para. 27. Third, in clarifying the structure of the Directive, the Court held that “the fact that the
Directive provides for certain derogations or refers in certain cases to national law does not mean
that in regard to the matters which it regulates harmonization is not complete.” Id. para. 28.
47 Id. para. 30.
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by the Council, EC Treaty, art. 94 did not explicitly allow Member
States to maintain or establish more stringent provisions. Because of
the difficulty in reaching an agreement among parties with conflicting
interests, the Directive was intended to completely harmonize product
liability and to establish a specific liability regime reflecting a complex
political equilibrium. 48
Moreover, the ECJ held that the consumer protection title
contained in EC Treaty art. 153, allowing Member States to maintain
higher standards of consumer protection, was not to “be relied on . . . [to
seek] a minimum harmonization of the laws of the Member States.” 49
The ECJ followed the reasoning of A.G. Geelhoed, who claimed that if
the Community wanted to change the liability regime, it could adopt a
new directive using a different legal basis, thereby modifying the
particular balance struck between consumers and producers when the
Directive was adopted in 1985. 50 Through deductive legal reasoning,
the A.G. further justified a maximal harmonization regime for the
Product Liability Directive on textual grounds. He referred to the
preamble of the directive, which explicitly referred to the unity and the
functioning of the internal market. Therefore, he claimed that a
minimal harmonization regime not adequately would fulfill this goal. 51
48 Id. para. 23; see also A.G. Opinion, supra note 43, para. 39. The Advocate General is not a
public prosecutor. He is a member of the ECJ, even though he does not participate in its
deliberations, and he has the same status as a judge. His individual opinion is presented after the
oral proceedings, but it does not reflect the view of the Court. However, when the ECJ follows
the A.G. opinion, it constitutes a precious source of information on the legal reasoning adopted by
the ECJ.
49 See González, supra note 43, para. 24; see also A.G. Opinion, supra note 43, para. 43.
[I]nserted into the Treaty after the adoption of the Directives . . . Article 153 EC is
worded as a valid instruction to the Community with regard to future policies.
Under that provision, the Community legislature would be entitled to undertake
initiatives to shift, in favor of consumers, the current balance between the interests of
producers and not those of consumers which is laid down in the Directive. However,
Article 153 EC does not, under any circumstances, grant Member States the power
unilaterally to adopt measures, which would infringe the rules of Community laid
down in directives to date. Any other interpretation would endanger the acquis
communautaire of the uniformity and correct functioning of the common market.
Id. para. 43.
50 See González, supra note 43, para. 24. This interpretation by the ECJ has important
implications for future harmonization measures since it establishes a presumption in favor of
maximal harmonisation. Unless future directives contain a provision explicitly authorizing
Member States to maintain or adopt legislation that is more stringent to secure a high level of
consumer protection, the presumption will be against such a possibility.
51 See A.G. Opinion, supra note 43.
The objective of the unity and functioning of the common market, which is set out in
the first and last recitals, does not accord with the view that the Directive only
provides for minimum harmonization. It can be deduced from the wording of the
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The same opinion by A.G. Geelhoed in Gonzaléz supported an
analogous judgment in Commission v. France. 52 The Commission
challenged the French government, alleging non-conformity in
transposing the Product Liability Directive. The French government
argued that such transposition would have infringed Article 6(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights by denying a fair trial to the
plaintiffs, who, under the Product Liability Directive, were left in a
situation of damnum absque injuria. The ECJ decided that European
law preempted those French product liability provisions, which were
incompatible with the Directive and more favorable to consumers.
Thus, the Court condemned France for not implementing the same
liability standards imposed by the Product Liability Directive. 53
In his opinion, A.G. Geelhoed explained that the evolution of
western private law at the beginning of the twentieth century developed
social legislation in order to protect vulnerable categories, such as
employees, tenants, and consumers. This ad hoc legislation deployed to
protect particular disadvantaged groups was created in derogation of
general private law regimes, which continued to apply as the default
rule. The decision about which category of harms and in which
situation the law should protect certain groups should be reached as the
result of a balancing conflicting considerations, and only the legislature
can balance “l’interet juridique materiel et l’efficacité de
l’administration de la justice.” The A.G. explained that the product
liability directive was the clear result of this balancing, and no
individual Member State could derogate from it. Thus, changes would
require a future policy enacted by the Community legislature. 54
In the aftermath of this judgment, France did not change one of the
last two recitals that the Community legislature considered that harmonization was
incomplete because there were still derogations open to the Member States.
Id. para. 50.
52 Case C-52/00, Commission v. French Republic, 2002 E.C.R. I-03827.
53 Id. The Court held that:
- by including damage less of EUR 500 in Article 1386-2 of the Civil Code;
- by providing in the first paragraph of Article 1386-7 thereof that the supplier of a
defective product is to be liable in all cases and on the same basis as the producer,
and
- by providing in the second paragraph of Article 1386-12 thereof that the producer
must prove that he has taken appropriate steps to avert the consequences of a
defective product in order to be able to rely on the grounds of exemption from
liability provided for in Article 7(d) and (e) of the Directive,
the French Republic has failed to fulfil [sic] its obligations under Articles 9(b), 3(3)
and 7 of the aforementioned directive
Id. para. 49.
54 See A.G. Opinion, supra note 43, para. 68.
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provisions of its civil code that conflicts with the Products Liability
Directive, which expressly exempts from liability the supplier of a
product when the producer of the product can be identified. In contrast,
the French civil code considered the supplier of a defective product
liable on the same basis as the producer, even if the supplier informed
the injured person of the supplier’s identity within a reasonable time. In
its judgment in March 2006, the ECJ held that France was in breach of
Community law not only by incorrectly transposing the directive but
also by not complying with the previous judgment of the ECJ. 55 Thus,
the French Republic was required to pay a penalty to the community,
whereby the ECJ ordered:
the French Republic to pay to the Commission of the European
Communities, into the ‘European Community own resources’
account, a penalty payment of EUR 31 650 for each day of delay in
taking the necessary measures to comply fully with the judgment in
Case C-52/00 Commission v France from delivery of the present
judgment until full compliance with the judgment in that case. 56

Similar to the French saga, in Commission v. Greece, the ECJ
found that the Greek consumer protection law did not include a
provision limiting recoverable damages to the five hundred Euro
threshold mentioned in Article 9 of the Product Liability Directive. 57
Greece attempted to justify its domestic provision by arguing that the
directive merely achieved a minimum harmonization regime that
allowed the Member States to maintain domestic provisions more
favorable to consumers. Moreover, it argued that the concept of
damage was not within the scope of the directive; thus, it should be
interpreted under national law to require full compensation to the
injured party. 58
In following its previous judgments and the Opinion of the A.G.,
the ECJ held that the Directive “seeks to achieve in the matters
regulated by it, complete harmonization of the laws, regulations and
As to the
administrative provision of the Member States.” 59
incompatibility of the threshold with the principles of Greek private
law, the ECJ used deductive reasoning and held that, “. . . the recourse
55 Case C-177/04, Commission v. French Republic, O.J. 2006 C131/10 (where the ECJ held
that “the French Republic has failed to take the necessary measures to comply fully with the
judgment in Case C-52/00 Commission v. France as regards the transposition of Article 3(3) of
Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 . . . .”). Id. para. 1.
56 Id. at para. 2.
57 See Case C- 154/00, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 2002 E.C.R. I – 03870, para. 8.
58 See id. paras. 22−23.
59 Id. para. 20.
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to provisions of domestic law to restrict the scope of the provisions of
Community law would have the effect of undermining the unity and
efficacy of that law and cannot consequently be accepted.”60
Commentators have debated this well-known trilogy of cases.
Commentators on the Left were especially enraged by the ECJ decisions
for at least three different reasons, which have varied over time. First,
Daniela Caruso addressed legislative resistance against European
integration emerging from the failed transposition of the Product
Liability Directive in France. 61 According to the resistance thesis,
while European bureaucrats and judges were deploying increasing
formalism in defending the doctrinal coherence of European law,
national elites were resisting its effects in France. 62
In the context of transposing the directive, the French government
was in a difficult situation: it had to adopt unpopular legislation over the
protests of national legal elites because it had to comply with its
obligations towards the Community under EC Treaty art. 10. 63 Not
surprisingly, France took more than a decade to implement the Product
Liability Directive, and it was condemned twice by the ECJ. Despite
the fact that, at the declaratory level, the French civil code embraced a
negligence regime, in practice, due to judge made law, courts relied on
the code provisions in sales contracts to enact a strict liability regime for
victims of product-related accidents.
Because France’s liability
standards were considered more favorable to consumers than the ones
set by the directive, the Commission in 1998 brought the French
government before the ECJ for a second time to implement the
directive. Both national politicians and the legal profession in France
had persistently resisted the complete transposition of the Product
Liability Directive.
Second, European consumer advocates claimed that the ECJ
rulings tipped the balance in favor of a particular approach to European
consumer policy: serving consumer interests through the internal market
60
61

Id. para. 24.
See Caruso, supra note 16, at 15 (claiming that the implementation of the Products
Liability Directive had important distributive consequences that the French Parliament was not
comfortable with).
62 See id.
63 EC Treaty art. 10 imposes upon Member States an obligation “[to] abstain from any
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.” EC Treaty art.
10, supra note 21. The ECJ has interpreted EC Treaty art. 10 to apply to unimplemented
directives and has imposed a duty on Member States to “refrain from taking any measures liable
seriously to compromise the result prescribed.” Case C-129/96, Inter-Environmental Wallonie
ASBL v. Region Wallonie, 1997 E.C.R. I-07411, para. 45; see also Case C-14/02, ATRAL SA v.
Belgian State, 2003 E.C.R. I-04431.
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and increasing consumer choice. 64 In contrast, they maintained that,
despite the ECJ trend toward self-regulation and the increasing maximal
harmonization tendency, EC consumer policy should remain a critical
tool to be widely developed for the protection of weaker parties rather
than enhancing consumer choice. 65 In particular, they stated that before
Commission v. France the Court had never taken such a clear-cut
position toward maximal harmonization. In fact, previous ECJ
judgments interpreting harmonizing directives in this area suggested a
less strict rule and a more flexible standard vis à vis the preemption of
Member State laws. 66
Third, social justice advocates argued that the ECJ should refrain
from deciding questions that should be determined by democratic
Although not explicitly, these lawyers deployed
institutions. 67
institutional competence arguments to express their skepticism on two
different fronts. First, they were skeptical that legal elites sitting in
Luxembourg would preserve the social justice values embedded in
national traditions and instead thought these elites would come to
prioritize market goals. Second, in following a Jacobinian tradition,
they believed that legal elites, in particular lawyers and judges, could
not be trusted to achieve social justice because, contrary to legislatures,
courts have not traditionally been a forum for social struggles. 68

64 See Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer
Policy in or Beyond the Internal Market?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367, 400 (2000) (“The
acceptance of the proper functioning of the (internal) market and the effective competition policy
as the very foundations of consumer policy does not mean that the consumer is reduced to the
status of a benefit-maximizing creature. Consumer wants, no matter how frivolous . . . can be
expressed in the market.”).
65 See Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age? 28
EUR. L. REV. 370, 376 (2003).
Thus, the scope for using the Treaty to allow Member States to improve on
European solutions is therefore very narrow. If maximal harmonization is the
favored approach of the Commission there will be no minimal harmonization clauses
in the directive(s) and the Court is unlikely to be able to construe the directive as a
minimal one. . . . Maximal harmonization fits into a pattern of approaches to
Community regulation that favor trade liberalization.
Id. at 376.
66 See Fabio Marchetti & Fernanda Nicola, Constitutionalizing Tobacco: The Ambivalence of
European Federalism, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 513 (2005).
67 See Hugh Collins, Editorial: The Future of European Private Law: An Introduction, 10
EUR. L.J. 649, 650 (2004).
68 See CARLO AUGUSTO CANNATA & ANTONIO GAMBARO, LINEAMENTI DI STORIA DELLA
GIURISPRUDENZA EUROPEA (3d ed. 1989).
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C. The Activist European Court of Justice and the Legitimation Puzzle
In Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH, the Court was asked
to interpret the notion of damages for the non-performance of a
contractual obligation. 69 Simone Leitner, a ten-year-old girl whose
parents booked an all-inclusive two-week holiday at a club in Turkey
through the travel agent TUI, developed symptoms of salmonella
poisoning attributed to the club’s food. The girl’s illness lasted
throughout the holiday and two weeks following her return to Austria.
Simone Leitner brought an action for damages against TUI before an
Austrian trial court, which awarded her damages for only physical pain
and suffering but denied her non-material damages for loss of
enjoyment of the holiday.
On appeal, the Austrian Landesgericht Linz referred the question
of the interpretation of Article 5 of the Package Travel Directive to the
ECJ. The question concerned which damages the organizer and/or the
retailer were liable for as a result of the non-performance or the
improper performance of the package tour contract. 70 Specifically, the
Austrian court asked the ECJ whether the directive required Member
States to provide for compensation of non-material damages, which
were excluded under Austrian law.
69

See Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, 2002 E.C.R. I02631.
70 Package Travel Directive, supra note 13. Article 5 provides:
1. Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the organizer and/or
retailer party to the contract is liable to the consumer for the proper performance of
the obligations arising from the contract, irrespective of whether such obligations are
to be performed by that organizer and/or retailer or by other suppliers of services
without prejudice to the right of the organizer and/or retailer to pursue those other
suppliers of services.
2. With regard to the damage resulting for the consumer from the failure to perform
or the improper performance of the contract, Member States shall take the necessary
steps to ensure that the organizer and/or retailer is/are liable unless such failure to
perform or improper performance is attributable neither to any fault of theirs nor to
that of another supplier of services . . . .
In the matter of damages arising from the non-performance or improper performance
of the services involved in the package, the Member States may allow compensation
to be limited in accordance with the international conventions governing such
services.
In the matter of damage other than personal injury resulting from the nonperformance or improper performance of the services involved in the package, the
Member States may allow compensation to be limited under the contract. Such
limitation shall not be unreasonable.
3. Without prejudice to the fourth subparagraph of § 2, there may be no exclusion by
means of a contractual clause from the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2.
Id. at art. 5.
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On the defendant’s side, the Austrian, the French, and the Finnish
government asserted that the Travel Package Directive aimed to provide
minimal harmonization; that is, what was not expressly covered by the
text of the Travel Package Directive remained a matter of Member
States’ competences. On the plaintiff’s side, the Belgian government
and the Commission pointed out that since the purpose of the Travel
Package Directive was to approximate the laws of Member States,
“damages” as used in the text was to be ‘construed broadly’ to include
the notion of non-material damages caused by loss of enjoyment of a
holiday. The ECJ holding recognized the right to compensation for
damage other than personal injury, including non-material damages. 71
Prominent commentators criticized the holding of the ECJ. In
particular, jurists advocating for regulatory competition and greater
efficiency of the common market have emphasized the activism of the
Leitner court and the consequences precipitated by the case. They
argue that the judgment created a ‘floodgate’ concern within the
Austrian legal system because it created the potential for judges to
award high non-material damages with respect to package-holidays.
They argued that Leitner would serve as precedent and create incentives
for consumers to litigate claims for high damages, thereby turning
litigation into an insurance mechanism. Scholars have pointed out that,
in extending the compensation for non-material damages, this decision
“stands [as] a fundamental value judgment with far-reaching economic
implications which the Community apparently was not (yet) ready to
take when the Directive was discussed by its institutions. This issue
was still left to the Member States.” 72
These jurists have a neoliberal Hayekian understanding of how the
market should function in the European Union and the role that courts
and legislatures should play in the single market. In particular, these
neoliberal jurists have asserted that the problem with the EU legal
system is that courts, instead of national parliaments, are making
important social welfare choices. These jurists highlight that the Leitner
holding is likely to alter an important equilibrium within national
private law regimes by undertaking the “Promethean job of creating a
European private law [which] should be shouldered by other

71 See Leitner, supra note 69. The Court affirmed that Article 5 [of the Package Travel
Directive] “is to be interpreted as conferring, in principle, on consumers a right to compensation
for non-material damage resulting from the non-performance or improper performance of the
services constituting a package holiday.” Id. para. 24.
72 Wulf-Henning Roth, Case C-168/00 Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co.KG,
40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 937 (2002).
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institutions.” 73
Both social justice scholars and neoliberal jurists have criticized
the controversial rulings of Gonzaléz, Commission v. France, and
Leitner. Even though these jurists have opposite political views on the
goals of European integration, they both condemn the ECJ for making
decisions that, in their eyes, should be left to the legislature rather than
courts.
Social justice advocates address questions concerning
distributive justice and the shrinking welfare state in the EU, while
neoliberal advocates are committed to efficiency goals and limited
social intervention in order to promote economic life and fairness.
However, paradoxically, they both espouse similar institutional
competence arguments to evaluate the ECJ and to delegitimate the role
of courts in favor of legislatures.
The aim of this article is to contextualize both the social justice
perspective and the neoliberal view in order to offer an explanation of
the evolution of European private law in light of wide constitutional,
political, and comparative law changes affecting legal scholarship.
Through an understanding of the institutional and the substantive
evolution of European integration—from merely market to social policy
objectives—this work traces the appearance of legitimation concerns
that were first used by commentators on the Left around the 1980s and
by commentators on the Right in the mid-1990s.
By analyzing the constitutional changes in the EU, the article
shows how scholars have strategically adopted, over time and
depending on the political circumstance and the debates they
participated in, the claim of “constitutional asymmetry.” When this
claim is translated into the Europeanization of private law discourse, it
enables jurists to conflate institutional competence arguments (courts
versus legislatures; European level versus Member State level) with
substantive arguments (efficiency versus equitable distribution; free
markets versus social goals). Thus, initially scholars on both the Left
and the Right have used constitutional asymmetry claims to criticize
ECJ judgments and delegitimate the structure of the European
architecture.
III. MARKET HARMONIZATION AND IDEOLOGY: CONSTITUTIONAL
ASYMMETRY IN THE EU
A. Building the Internal Market Through Law: Negative and Positive
73

Id. at 950.
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Integration
Economists predicted that European market integration would
initially entail the elimination of trade barriers via market liberalization
but that it would also later require extensive re-regulation. 74 In the mid1980s, the Delors Commission launched its agenda for the completion
of the internal market. 75 Deepening market integration required the
Commission to adopt wide policy action at the Community level via reregulation and harmonization of contract and tort law. 76 In particular,
the Community harmonized national consumer laws that, due to diverse
regulations, impeded goods from circulating freely in the internal
market. 77 The Commission regulated sectoral areas of private law via
directives, which obtained the necessary political support of Member
Initially, the
States notwithstanding their thin legal basis. 78
Commission addressed the diversity of consumer regulations to assert
the existence of an obstacle to cross-border trade, which prompted the
use of directives as a re-regulatory device. Later, the Commission
became more cautious in adopting directives for cases in which the link
between the harmonized measure and the establishment of the internal
market was tenuous. 79
In the 1990s, scholars pointed out the increasing “competence
creep” in the Commission’s initiatives to harmonize private law. 80
They pointed to the principle of attributed competences in the EC
Treaty art. 5, which limits the power of the Community to the
competences conferred to it in the Treaty. 81 Because there is no explicit
74 See WILLEM MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THEORY, PRACTICE,
POLICY (1999).
75 See JACQUES DELORS, OUR EUROPE (1996).
76 See Products Liability Directive, supra note 13; Council Directive 85/77, 1985 O.J. (L 372)
31 [hereinafter Doorstep Selling Directive] (for the protection of consumers in respect of
contracts negotiated away from business premises).
77 See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY (1997).
78 See id. at 346; Stephen Weatherill, Reflections on the EC’s Competence to Develop a
“European Contract Law,”13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 405, 411 (2005) (“In some cases, however
the political reality was that Member States were committed to the development of an EC
consumer policy and, in the absence of any more appropriate legal basis in the Treaty, chose to
‘borrow’ the competence to harmonize laws to put it in place.”).
79 See Stephen Weatherill, The European Commission’s Green Paper on European Contract
Law: Context, Content and Constitutionality, 24 J. OF CONSUMER POL’Y 339, 347 (2001)
(commenting on the legal basis of the Doorstep Selling Directive).
80 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2405−06 (1991);
Mark A. Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community, 14
J. PUB. POL’Y 95 (1994).
81 See EC Treaty, supra note 21 (“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.”).

NICOLA_ARTICLE_FINAL

5/7/2008 2:23:55 PM

200X] TRANSATLANTICISM IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 123
competence to harmonize private law rules in the Treaty, consumer
contract directives were based on an expansive functional reading of EC
Treaty art. 95—as a means to establish and ensure that the internal
market functioned properly. 82
However, a decade after the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht,
the Tobacco Advertising Judgment in 2000 illustrated the importance of
the problem of competence creep. 83 In striking down a European
directive for the first time, the ECJ set new limits to positive integration
through Community re-regulation. In this case, the ECJ relied on the
constitutional principle of attributed competences to limit the expansive
reading of EC Treaty art. 95 by the Community decision-makers. 84
Fearing the expansion of Community competences at the expense of
Member States, the German government challenged the legitimacy of
the Tobacco Advertising Directive, which imposed a total ban on the
advertisement of tobacco products. 85 In questioning the legitimacy of
the Directive before the ECJ, Germany alleged that the objective of the
Directive was to regulate public health rather than the marketing of
tobacco products. 86 The ECJ annulled the Tobacco Advertising
Directive for lack of a legal basis on the grounds that it was a health
measure rather than an internal market provision. 87 Because the
Community has no competence to harmonize public health matters,
which falls under the regulatory competence of the Member States, the
Court ruled that the Directive was void. 88
Even though negative and positive integration were institutionally
associated with the ECJ and the Commission, respectively, this part
shows that both phases are present simultaneously in the development
of European law. Rather than two alternative processes taking place in
different periods of time, negative and positive integration took place at
the same time through the collaboration of the ECJ with the
Commission.
82
83

See WEATHERILL, supra note 77, at 14.
See Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of
the European Union, 2000 E.C.R. I-08419 [hereinafter Tobacco Advertising Judgment].
84 See Stephen Weatherill, Why Object to the Harmonization of Private Law by the EC?, 5
EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 633, 641−46 (2004).
85 See Council Directive 98/43, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9 [hereinafter Tobacco Advertising
Directive].
86 See Marchetti & Nicola, supra note 66.
87 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83. The Tobacco Advertising Directive
was enacted pursuant to EC Treaty art. 95, which authorizes the approximation of national laws
with the express objective of establishing a single European market. See also EC Treaty, supra
note 21, art. 95.
88 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83, para. 83.
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Scholars depicted negative integration as comprising the initial
phase of the internal market in the 1960s and the 1970s, in which the
Community aimed to remove “tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other
barriers to trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition.” 89
Negative integration was built into the Treaty of Rome through the
explicit commitment to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers and to
enhance competition within the internal market. 90
Negative integration consists of the prohibition of quantitative
restrictions to trade under EC Treaty art. 28, a sort of European
equivalent to the dormant commerce clause in the United States. 91 The
ECJ broadly defined national measures as those having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions. Thus, the ECJ exercised vertical
judicial review each time national laws created an impediment to
interstate commerce. 92 In this scenario, the ECJ played a crucial role in
constitutionalizing the four freedoms: the free movement of goods,
services, capital, and persons. 93 By means of direct effect and
supremacy of EC law, the Court interpreted the four freedoms to prevail
over national legislation. 94 Through vertical judicial review, which had
“low visibility” compared to the political opposition to Community
decision-making, the ECJ struck down national laws that created
barriers to trade. 95
Conflicts arose within the internal market when an increasing
number of national measures conflicted with the European dormant
commerce clause, or when businesses entering a new market denounced
the ability of a Member State to impose technical requirements limiting
the free movement of goods. In response, the ECJ adopted two
89
90
91

See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 45.
See id. at 50.
See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 28 (“Quantitative restrictions on imports and all
measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.”). For a
comparative perspective, see Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of
Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1893 (2001).
92 See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 873; see also J.H.H. Weiler,
Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE
NAFTA 206 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000) (explaining that “[r]emoving obstacles, not merely
discrimination and protectionism is the hallmark of the true common or single market-place”).
93 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 54.
94 See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1982
Y.B. EUR. L. 257, 257−306.
95 See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993); SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 24 (explaining how the
invisible power of the ECJ extended “the prohibitions of negative integration against national
policy measures that could constitute barriers to free market”).
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competing strategies. First, by narrowly interpreting the list of
derogations falling under EC Treaty art. 30, 96 the Court clarified that
Member States could not utilize the exemptions to serve their economic
objectives. 97 Second, in its landmark decision Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ
created a test that conferred greater power to the Court to solve future
disputes. 98
The ECJ deployed the reasonableness test of Cassis de Dijon to
strike down national laws that were not proportionate to their goals. By
balancing the (national) mandatory interests permitted under EC Treaty
art. 30 against the (European) guarantees of free movement, the ECJ
upheld national laws that were in fact proportionate to their goals. 99
The Cassis test did allow the ECJ to apply the European dormant
commerce clause more broadly, but it also increased the ambiguity of
ECJ jurisprudence. 100 On the one hand, the test enabled the ECJ to
strike down national laws that were not proportionate to the interests
96

See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 30.

The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions
or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on
grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however,
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States.
Id.
97
98

See Case 113/80, Commission v. Ireland, 1981 E.C.R. 01625, para. 7.
See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 00649, [hereinafter Cassis]. Cassis is the landmark decision concerning the free
movement of goods. In interpreting EC Treaty art. 28, which regulates the free movement of
goods, the ECJ asserted its competence to assess the intrinsic reasonableness of all national
health, safety, or environmental product regulations that could have a negative impact on crossborder trade.
99 See Cinéthèque S.A. v. Federation Nationale Des Cinemas Français, Cases 60 & 61/84,
[1986] 1985 E.C.R.; Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc, Case 145/88 [1989] ECR 3851. In
both cases the ECJ considered national laws justified by mandatory interests and proportionate to
their goals.
100 See Cassis, supra note 98, para. 8. The ECJ laid down the test and the list of the mandatory
interests Member States could use to justify their national legislation:
[O]bstacles to movement within the community resulting from disparities between
the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order
to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions
and the defense of the consumer.
Id.
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they were protecting; on the other hand, the Cassis test allowed the ECJ
to expand the list of derogations under EC Treaty art. 28. 101
In implementing the Cassis test, the Commission adopted the
concept of “mutual recognition,” stating that when a product was
lawfully marketed in one Member State, it could circulate freely in
other Member States as well. 102 By focusing on only one side of the
test, namely that national measures restricting cross-border trade would
be void unless they were proportionate to their aims, the Commission
interpreted Cassis in a pro-freedom-of-movement fashion. Mutual
recognition alleviated the harmonization burden of the Commission,
which could now secure the Europeanization of national regulations that
created obstacles to trade. 103 However, some scholars asserted that the
implementation of the Cassis test by the Commission actually aimed to
limit Member States’ regulatory powers. In short, these scholars
maintained that mutual recognition triggered a race to the bottom within
the internal market by endorsing free movement at the expense of
Member States’ welfare legislation, thus promoting European consumer
choice over national social goals. 104
Negative integration left a need for a supplementary positive
contribution by the Community to the harmonization of Member States’
laws. 105 In the mid-1980s the Community harmonized door-to-door
sales and product liability rules. 106 By the end of the 1980s, numerous
consumer contracts directives created a body of EC consumer policy,
101 See Case 463/01, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2004 E.C.R. I-11705; Case
112/00, Eugen Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Planzuge v. Republik Österreich, 2003
E.C.R.. I-5659.
102 See Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences of the Judgment
Given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in case 120/78, 1980 O.J. C 256/2 (Mar. 10
1980).
103 See Kenneth A. Armstrong, Mutual Recognition, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET 225 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002) (defining three dimensions of the
policy evolution of the concept of mutual recognition).
104 See SCHARPF, supra note 14; WEATHERILL, supra note 77, at 10-11. In the 1980s the ECJ
deployed the rhetoric of the active European consumer who shops and enters into contracts across
Member States. This became a powerful image in order to eliminate national regulations, which,
according to the Court, limited the free circulation of goods and were protectionist measures
aimed at protecting national economies rather than protecting consumers.
105 See Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe, in REGULATING
EUROPE 58 (Giandomenico Majone, ed., 1996). Similar to environmental protection, consumer
regulation included hundreds of pieces of legislation, but as Majone puts it, “while the first
directives were for the most part concerned with product regulation, and hence could be justified
by the need to prevent that national standards would create non-tariff barriers to the free
movement of goods, later directives increasingly stressed process regulation . . . and thus aimed
explicitly at environmental rather than free-trade objectives.” Id.
106 See Doorstep Selling Directive, supra note 76; Products Liability Directive, supra note 13.
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which was expressly included under the competence or jurisdiction of
the Community in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 107 Even though these
directives regulated consumer contracts, their goal was the
establishment and functioning of the internal market, based on EC
Treaty art. 95, rather than the creation of a body of EC consumer policy
under EC Treaty art. 153. 108 Jurists both criticized and acclaimed these
directives, which in certain contexts lowered and in other contexts
raised national standards of protection. 109
Positive integration led jurists to start questioning the relation
between European constitutionalism and the harmonization of private
law. Despite the fact that the Community had no explicit competence to
harmonize private law, by the end of the 1990s there was a consistent
body of European contract law that, according to the Commission, only
served the goal of efficient market integration rather than other social
goals. 110 Moreover, in 2001, the Commission envisaged among other
things, the possibility of adopting a uniform European contract code,
which became central to scholarly debates. 111
In these debates, jurists questioned the competences of the
Community to regulate private law in order to avoid ultra vires acts
annulled by the ECJ. 112 To assert the competence of the Community to
harmonize a particular private law rule, the Commission often selects
EC Treaty art. 95 as a legal basis because it is a broad provision for the
107 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 153; WEATHERILL, supra note 77 (describing how EC
consumer policy constructed its identity in the shadow of fundamental constitutional omissions
from the original treaty); Geraint Howells, Soft Law and Consumer Law, in LAW MAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998).
108 From 1985 to 1999 the Commission agenda triggered seven directives on European
contract law. See Commission Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, at 7,
COM (2001) 531 final (February 10, 2001) [hereinafter Green Paper].
109 See Carla Joustra, Consumer Law, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 140, (Arthur
Hartkamp et. al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
110 The acquis communautaire is the result of the body of directives and their common
interpretation by the ECJ. See Reiner Schulze, The Acquis Communautaire and the Development
of European Contract Law, in INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AND FORMATION OF CONTRACT IN
THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 15 (Reiner Schulze et al. eds., 2003); Reiner Schulze, European
Private Law and Existing EC Law, 19 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 3, 10 (2005) (explaining the
development of a European contract acquis).
111 See Action Plan, supra note 31. Jurists suggested that to adopt a European civil code the
Community could, in theory, deploy particular legal bases or even draft an intergovernmental
treaty. Walter van Gerven, Communication on European Contract Law: Codifying European
Private
Law,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.5.pdf
(last visited Dec. 6, 2007); Walter van Gerven, Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at
the
European
Level
(Jan.
2005),
available
at
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/ccle/cv.php?id=WVG (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
112 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83.
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establishment and functioning of the internal market. However,
disgruntled minorities, namely Member States unhappy with an EU
directive or a regulation, increasingly challenge before the ECJ
Community acts adopted through the majority voting by asserting that
they lack a valid legal basis. In the Tobacco Advertising Judgment, the
ECJ for the first time annulled a directive because it lacked a legal
basis. In that judgment, the Court also elaborated a test to determine
when EC Treaty art. 95 can be asserted as a legal basis for Community
acts. 113 The ECJ made clear that the Community does not have a
general power to regulate the internal market. Rather in order to
harmonize a specific legal issue, the Commission needs to show that
different national regulations have created a significant distortion of
competition that hinders the free movement of goods. 114 As a result, the
Commission has become more cautious in its harmonization proposals,
which must be based on relevant hard data demonstrating that
disparities in national contract laws create market failures or obstacles
to competition. 115 As scholars have pointed out, the competence creep
resulted in a heightened burden of proof for the Commission’s
regulatory initiatives on European private law. 116
Moreover, jurists also questioned the preemption of national laws
by European directives and the shift of the ECJ and the Commission
toward a maximal approach to harmonization. While the Commission
can determine the type of harmonization adopted by a directive, which
is then amended or adopted as a result of the political compromise
between the Council and the EP, 117 the actual level of harmonization is
113

Id. EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 230 specifies four grounds of review for community

acts:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European
Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the
ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European
Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall for this
purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European
Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or
of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
Id.
114

See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83, paras. 106-8; A.G. Opinion, supra note
43, paras. 82—98.
115 See Com. on Contract Law, supra note 30; see also Stephen Weatherill, The Commission’s
Options for Developing EC Consumer Protection and Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional
Basis 13 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 497 (2002).
116 See Weatherill, supra note 79; Armin Von Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast, The European
Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: The Current Law and Proposal for its Reform 39
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 227 (2002).
117 See Van Gerven, supra note 21, 508−12 (explaining how the Commission combined the
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often unclear from the text, and the ECJ therefore is called upon to
interpret the directive.
Recently, ECJ jurisprudence and the
Commission’s initiatives on European contract law have favored a
maximal approach to harmonization, which allows no derogation by
Member State laws; thus, the directive completely preempts the field. 118
In contrast, a minimal harmonization approach allows Member States to
maintain more stringent rules than the ones set by the directive. 119 The
Commission’s justification for maximal harmonization is to further
market integration that will on the one hand increase the coherence of
existent acquis communautaire, 120 while on the other hand, it will
benefit both businesses and consumers by ensuring legal certainty in
contractual transactions. 121 In addressing this regulatory shift, scholars
are highly divided between advocating for maximal harmonization,
because it will lead to a more integrated and efficient common market,
and advocating against maximum harmonization, because it will likely
lower, rather than increase, national standards of protection. 122
In describing European integration, scholars associate negative
integration with the constitutionalization of free movement via ECJ
adjudication, whereas they associate positive integration with European
re-regulation via the legislative initiatives of the Commission. But, in
fact, both the ECJ and the Commission have been jointly involved in
both positive and negative integration.
In order to legitimize
Community action in the eyes of the Member States, cooperation
between the ECJ and the Commission is necessary to assure the
implementation of EC law and to strengthen Community trends towards
centralization or decentralization.
As illustrated earlier, a striking example of this supranational
cooperation that centralized and strengthened Community action vis à
vis the Member States took place in the mid-1970s with the creation of
the Cassis test by the ECJ, which was subsequently adopted by the
different harmonization methods in the various fields).
118 See Gonzaléz, supra note 43; Jens Karsten & Gosta Petri, Towards a Handbook on
European Contract Law and Beyond: The Commission’s 2004 Communication “European
Contract Law and The Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward,” 28 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 31,
32−33 (2005).
119 See Case C-11/92, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health, 1993 E.C.R. I-03545.
120 The acquis communataire in a particular legal field encompasses all EC law sources
stemming from the treaty, community acts (regulations, directives, or communications), and case
law from the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI). See Reiner Schulze, European Private
Law and Existing EC Law, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 3, 10 (2005).
121 See Action Plan, supra note 31.
122 See Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification of
EC Consumer Law, 27 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 317 (2004).
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Commission. According to the Cassis test, any national regulation
hindering cross-border trade must be justified by a mandatory interest of
the state and be proportionate to its regulatory aim. 123 In the aftermath
of Cassis, the Commission adopted the principle of mutual recognition,
which entailed the automatic harmonization of legal standards. Thus, in
adopting the Cassis test, the Commission, together with the ECJ, was
pursuing a Community centralizing agenda.
Another example of this joint cooperation emerged in the mid1980s with the distinction elaborated by the ECJ in France v. Keck and
Mithouard. This decision influenced the Commission’s regulatory
initiatives.
In light of Keck the Commission initiated a new
decentralization trend, both in its legislative initiatives as well as its
executives ones, aimed at restraining Community action vis à vis the
Member States. 124 In Keck, the ECJ created a distinction between
“product requirements,” which fall under the scrutiny of the EC Treaty
art. 28, and “selling arrangements,” which do not fall under the ECJ’s
scrutiny. The distinction rests on the different regulatory nature of the
two. In characterizing selling arrangements as a neutral regulatory
device, the ECJ allowed Member States to regulate the modalities of
sales because, according to the Court, these did not directly affect
interstate sales. Thus, selling arrangements were left to the discretion of
123

Following Cassis, the Commission interpreted the ECJ holding as advancing the principle
of mutual recognition, entailing the automatic harmonization of legal standards. See EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON A NEW APPROACH AND A
GLOBAL
APPROACH
(2000),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pdf.
[The Cassis case] provides the key elements for mutual recognition. The effect of
this case is as follows.
Products legally manufactured or marketed in one country should in principle move
freely throughout the Community where such product meet equivalent levels of
protection to those imposed by the Member State of exportation and where they are
marketed in the territory of the exported country.
In absence of Community measures, Member States are free to legislate in their own
territory.
Barriers to trade, which result from differences between national legislations, may
only be accepted, if national measures:
are necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements (such as health, safety,
environmental and consumer protection);
serve a legitimate purpose justifying the breach of the principle of free movement of
goods; and
can be justified with regard to the legitimate purpose and are proportionate with the
aims.
Id. at 7.
124 See Case C-267/91, France v. Keck and Mitouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-06097; Nobert Reich, The
“November Revolution” of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Merng and Audi Revisited, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 459 (1994).
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local regulatory interventions. Similarly, the Commission adopted the
Keck decentralizing strategy in its proposals to harmonize product
requirements by letting the Member States exercise regulatory control
over their selling agreements. 125
These examples show that both negative and positive integration
strategies have been part of the Community agenda pursued jointly by
the ECJ and the Commission, despite their different powers and
institutional capacities. Moreover, it shows that, as predicted by
scholars, the problem of the “competence creep” or lack of legal basis
should be managed by both the Commission and the ECJ jointly. In
fact, the ECJ made clear in the Tobacco Advertising judgment that
Community Acts proposed by the Commission under a broad provision
of the EC Treaty, such as art. 95, need to be substantiated by further
evidence. 126 In addition to showing a legal basis for harmonization
efforts in a particular area, the Commission will have to show that the
different national legislative provisions have created real obstacles to
competition. In this way disgruntled minorities will be less likely to
bring a Community Act for horizontal judicial review before the ECJ
and the Court less likely to annul it.
B. A Genealogy of Constitutional Asymmetry in European Legal
Consciousness
Scholars have divided the process of integration into two
competing phases. The first phase of negative integration entailed
market-making strategies through EC competition law and the
constitutionalization of the four freedoms (goods, services, capital, and
A second phase of positive integration entailed
workers). 127
Community re-regulation through market-correcting strategies. For
some scholars, the process of negative integration advanced by
supranational institutions consisted mostly of market deregulation

125 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83, paras. 106−13; see also Marchetti &
Nicola, supra note 66 (discussing the follow up of the Tobacco Advertising Directive and the new
legislative initiatives of the Community).
126 See WEATHERILL, supra note 77, at 14. On the “competence creep” in the EU, see
Pollack, supra note 80.
127 Negative integration has been achieved mostly by judicial fiat. The ECJ through vertical
judicial review has been voiding domestic laws clashing with the free movement provisions of the
EC Treaty because of their protectionist goals. Many authors have linked negative integration
with one of the initial ECJ decisions on free movement of goods. In Dassonville, in the early
1970s, the ECJ shifted the burden of proof to the Member States to demonstrate that their
domestic laws were not in conflict with the free movement of goods provision of Article 28 EC
Treaty.. See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, supra note 25.
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through the elimination of trade barriers. Under the pressure of
negative integration, Member States managed to preserve their national
welfare states, but their capacity to maintain public interest regulations
through national environmental, public health, and consumer safety
laws was severely limited by the pressure of negative integration. 128
Initially, positive integration, or market-correcting measures,
consisted in re-regulation at the Community level, mostly via directives,
aimed at the narrow goal of establishing a functioning internal market.
Later, in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht expanded EC competences to
regulate consumer and environmental protection to maintain high
standards of protection to guarantee the safety and public interest of
European citizens. 129 Because of these constitutional changes, the
Community has broader competences that go beyond the mere internal
market scope. In noticing this change, scholars who are concerned with
national welfare regimes maintain that a constitutional asymmetry
pervades the EU institutional arrangement. Thus, the legitimacy of the
Community is at stake, and the interrelation between economic
globalization and European integration through judicial activism leads
to the “weakening of political legitimacy in Western Europe.” 130
According to Fritz Scharpf, while negative integration led to the
establishment of the internal market, positive integration or marketcorrecting strategies were “limited by the need to achieve action
consensus among a wide range of divergent national and group
interests.” 131 This is what Sharpf calls the “decoupling of economic
integration and social protection issues which has characterized the real
process of European integration . . . .” 132 Likewise, jurists addressing
European law, and in particular the process of harmonization of private
law, argued that positive integration could not always fill the regulatory
gap left by negative integration in the EU. 133 Most importantly, the
128 See 1 Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, in FROM VULNERABILITY TO
COMPETITIVENESS (Fritz W. Scharpf & Vivien A. Schmidt eds., 2000); THE NEW POLITICS OF
THE WELFARE STATE (Paul Pierson ed., 2001).
129 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 95 (ex art. 100A), art. 152-3 (expanding the
competences of the EU for consumer protection and public health).
130 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 2; see also HANS-W. MICKLITZ, THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN THE EU: SUNDAY TRADING, EQUAL TREATMENT AND GOOD FAITH
17 (2005).
131 Id. at 71.
132 Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, in
INTEGRATION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION 109, 110 (Joseph H. H. Weiler et al. eds.,
2003).
133 See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union
After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331, 378 (2003) (claiming that “[f]or
many years, this test allowed the ECJ to strike down many forms of state regulation as
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constitutional asymmetry consisted of the fact that while the
harmonization of the internal market was based largely on economic
rationales, social protection initiatives were to be left either to the
Member States or to difficult compromises in European policies. 134
In providing a genealogy of the scholarly claim that the EU is
pervaded by a constitutional asymmetry when compared to the
constitutional arrangements of its Member States, the goal is to depart
from questions of origins or foundations and instead to focus on
accidental events, historical facts, and influential scholarship that
shaped the discourse on the Europeanization of private law. 135
During the 1980s, scholars were familiar with the notion of a
“democratic deficit” intrinsic to the Community decision-making
processes. According to Joseph Weiler, the democratic deficit could be
traced back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which gave power to the
executive branch (the Commission) at the expense of the legislative
In Weiler’s view, supranational structural
branch (the EP). 136
deficiencies were aggravated by two elements. First, the dual character
of supranationalism revealed that legal, instead of political, processes
fueled European integration. Second, the lack of democratic legitimacy
was reflected in the activism of a quasi-federal judiciary and the limited
powers of the EP. 137 Thus, in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in
1992, the “transformation of Europe” led to a paradoxical situation.
While political scientists speculated that intergovernmental decisionmaking slowed down European integration, lawyers, observing the
federal judiciary, perceived that European integration “moved
powerfully ahead.” 138 The widespread concern among scholars was
that a quasi-federal judiciary was driving European integration and
incompatible with the Treaty of Rome. Such holdings resulted, to varying degrees, in the
disempowerment of local governments. The ensuing normative vacuum would at times, but not
always, be filled by Community regulation”).
134 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 59.
135 See Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 139 (Donald F.
Bouchard ed., 1977).
136 See J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE. ‘DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?’ AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999). Weiler explains that the
notion of a “democratic deficit” reinforced the fear that the Community would increasingly
decide on issues that are perceived to be symbolically of national competence, thus triggering
reactions from French or Germans citizens that the Brussels bureaucrats tell us “how to run our
lives.” In Weiler’s view, at the core of the democratic deficit, were European policies ramifying
beyond the economic sphere and decision-making processes with low accountability. Id. at 77.
137 See Joseph Weiler, Community, Member States and European Integration, 21 J. COMMON
MT. STUDS. 39, 51−52 (1982).
138 See Weiler, supra note 80, at 2410.
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leaving behind political and democratically elected bodies, resulting in
increased asymmetry between law and politics in the EU.
In the mid-1990s, Fritz Scharpf elaborated further on the idea of
asymmetry between European law and politics by analyzing the patterns
of economic integration. He argued that negative integration had
prevailed in Europe at the expense of positive integration. As a result,
negative integration constrained national regulatory capacities through
the legal prohibitions contained in the Treaty and the downward
pressure of regulatory competition. 139 According to Scharpf, there is a
fundamental “constitutional asymmetry” between policies promoting
market efficiencies and those promoting social protection and equality.
These two groups of policies are not competing on a similar
constitutional level. 140 European integration has created a relationship
between economic and social policies that “has become asymmetric[,]
as economic policies have been progressively Europeanized, while
social protection policies [have] remained at the national level.” 141
By referring to these scholarly interpretations of European
integration, jurists perceived the process of harmonization as having a
deregulatory bias, enabling European bureaucrats and, especially,
judges to foster market deregulation at the expense of national social
provisions. When transferred to the realm of European private law, the
constitutional asymmetry claim enabled jurists to make institutional
competence arguments when commenting on ECJ judgments. European
private lawyers who disagreed with the decisions of the Court argued
for greater deference to domestic courts. Jurists made constitutional
asymmetry claims about the EU to communicate two different concepts.
For some, the asymmetry claim stood for the predominance of freemarket concerns over national social goals; for others, the asymmetry
claim stood for the imbalance between a powerful ECJ and a weak
Community legislature.
When these claims were translated into the private law debate,
some jurists envisioned contract law as a set of market-oriented
informational measures, aiming to extend party autonomy. They
139 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 59-60. Through the “constitutionalization” of competition
law, the ECJ launched a successful “legal attack on the privileged status of the service
public . . . on the grounds that the authorizing legislation was in violation of competition law.” In
Scharpf’s view, the liberalization of EC policies has “eliminated the possibility of using publicsector industries as an employment buffer,” therefore “European legal constrains have greatly
reduced the capacity of national governments to influence growth and employment in the
economies for whose performance they are politically accountable.” See also Scharpf, supra note
132, at 648.
140 Scharpf, supra note 132, at 646.
141 Id. at 665-66.
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welcomed the harmonization of contract law characterized by negative
integration. 142 In contrast, other jurists who conceived of contract law
as a redistributive tool that limited individual freedom argued in favor
of a national resistance to Europeanization, thus attacking
harmonization to promote national private law traditions. 143
C. Democratic Legitimacy in Constitutional Adjudication
In addressing ECJ adjudication, European jurists have put forward
democratic legitimacy concerns by adopting recurrent legal
dichotomies, which characterize the constitutional asymmetry claim
(free market versus social goals; European level versus Member State
level; and law versus politics). Jurists have pointed out the dangers of
European judicial lawmaking, which tends to prevail over national
legislation, over Community acts, and even over national judiciaries.
They have put forward two different democratic legitimacy arguments
regarding the ECJ’s vertical and horizontal power of judicial review and
a third one concerning the power of the ECJ to interpret directives that
harmonize private law rules.
First, European jurists claimed that the constitutionalization of the
European dormant commerce clause, namely EC Treaty art. 28, enabled
the ECJ, through vertical judicial review, to strike down national
legislation protecting consumers, the environment, and public health. 144
They argued that the ECJ will generally annul domestic regulations
democratically approved by national parliaments by means of countermajoritarian rulings. Moreover, European jurists claimed that, in
balancing the free movement of goods and services against national
social goals, the ECJ tends to constantly favor free trade over local
interests. 145 For instance, in Gambelli, the ECJ interpreted the Treaty
142 See Jürgen Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common Market, 33 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1169 (1996); Von Ernst-Joachim Mestmäker, On the Legitimacy of European Law,
58 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 615 (1994).
143 See Caruso, supra note 16; Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 230−31 (1994).
144 See MADURO, supra note 26 (highlighting that the ECJ could interpret EC Treaty art. 28 to
create refined criteria to prevent State protectionism or to rely on the general notion of a
European economic constitution, which was “built on the free market, open competition, and a
particular view of the kinds of regulation that are acceptable”).
145 See Cassis, supra note 98; Case 212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen,
1999 E.C.R. I-01459 (1999). In the Centros case, Danish authorities denied the freedom of
establishment (art. 43 TEU) to Centros, a private limited company registered in the UK that was
trying to circumvent national rules concerning the paying-up of minimal capital. The ECJ ruled
that this Danish provision is contrary to the free movement principle. Similar to the mutual
recognition principle, Centros establishes that, since the company was legally incorporated in
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provisions on the free movement of services to favor the free trade
interest over the national one. 146 Mr. Gambelli, who took bets from
Italian gamblers on sports events, transmitted these data electronically
to a UK betting company. His activity constituted a fraud under Italian
law, which requires that those operating gambling activity on sporting
events obtain a state granted license. The ECJ ruled that Italian
administrative and criminal rules were not proportionate to the
mandatory interest they sought to protect. Thus, the Italian regulations
created a barrier to providing cross-border services that was
incompatible with the principle of free movement of services included
in the Treaty. In short, the ECJ ruling annulled two national provisions
that had been democratically approved by a national parliament.
A second democratic legitimacy claim addresses the ECJ’s power
of horizontal judicial review as deployed in the Tobacco Advertising
Judgment to annul a directive. 147 After the judgment, the democratic
legitimacy concern with EC law prevailing over European politics
increased exponentially. Jurists have highlighted how horizontal
judicial review enables disgruntled legislative minorities (i.e., national
governments) to bring claims against Community institutions before the
ECJ, who then strikes down directives adopted through the co-decision
procedure. 148 Because of the administrative legal nature of the Treaty,
the ECJ has broad power to exercise horizontal judicial review over
Community legislation. 149 In the aftermath of the Tobacco Advertising
Judgment, scholars drew parallels between ECJ adjudication and the
Rehnquist Court in the United States, in that the latter struck down
federal legislation adopted by Congress under the Commerce Clause in
the well-known U.S. Supreme Court cases Lopez and Morrison. 150
accordance with the law of another Member State (UK), it has the right to register its branch in
Denmark. Id. para. 7. 21.
146 See Case C-243/01, Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. I13031 (proving the consistency of the ECJ jurisprudence on the four freedoms).
147 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83. In annulling the Directive on the
ground that the ban on tobacco advertising regulated public health instead of the internal market,
the Court held that the ban fell under the competence of Member States and not of the
Community legislature.
148 See WEATHERILL, supra note 79.
149 See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW (1993); Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism: the Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999)
(addressing EU law in relation to French administrative law).
150 See Geraint G. Howells, Federalism in the USA and EC—The Scope for Harmonized
Legislative Activity Compared, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 601, 620 (2002) (comparing the Tobacco
Advertising Judgment to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the limits of the Commerce
Clause, Lopez and Morrison: “Within this area of exclusive Community competence it is to be
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A third democratic legitimacy concern addresses the excessive use
of preliminary ruling procedures by domestic courts in referring
questions of EC law interpretation directly to the ECJ. 151 Some jurists
maintain that this process undermines the role of national courts, while
the ECJ obtains more power to judicially define contractual rules. Thus,
scholars have suggested that national courts be more cautious in
referring questions to the ECJ through preliminary rulings. Member
States’ domestic courts have adopted this cautious approach, in
particular the courts in Scandinavia. 152
Ultimately, ECJ commentators effectively claimed that these three
different types of democratic legitimacy arguments showed that there
was a “constitutional asymmetry” in the EU framework. In fact, rather
than focusing on national resistance, local discontent, and social
struggles against European integration, legal elites all over Europe
began a sophisticated legal dialogue with Luxemburg and Brussels.
Rather than an open discussion exposing federal, socio-economic, and
ideological disagreements among the different legal elites, the European
legal elites exposed their disagreements over democratic legitimacy.
This moderation effect of the legal dialogue between national elites and
European judges was successful in channeling the conflicts and
constraining the debates to federal adjudication, judicial law making,
and institutional competences. 153
IV. THE PHASES AND THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
A. Three Phases in the Europeanization of Contract Law
From the mid-1980s until today, three different scholarly phases
have characterized the debate on the harmonization of private law.
Each period reflects a change in the methodologies as well as in the
normative aspirations of lawyers who have shaped the field of European
private law. The first phase from 1985 to 1992 was characterized by

hoped that the Court does not become too interventionist both because it is not well equipped to
determine what is needed to create the internal market and because as protection is a legitimate
objective, the level of that protection is best determined by the political procedures laid down in
the Treaty.”).
151 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 234.
152 This phenomenon became relevant in Sweden when the Commission asked the government
to press courts to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ. See Brochs Redovisningsbyra KB,
http://www.broch.se/html/sve/news/2004/news6.htm (last visited November 10, 2007).
153 See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 220-21.
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market functionalism in the harmonization of private law rules. 154 The
second phase from 1992 to 2000 was characterized by three different
constitutional understandings of European integration: the European
economic constitution, constitutional asymmetry, and deliberate
supranationalism. 155 Finally, the third phase of European contract law
from 2001 to the present has been characterized by a deep ideological
divide between neoliberal and social justice advocates 156 as well as by a
new trend in European scholarship that I will call Deliberative
Supranationalism or New Governance advocacy.
During the first phase, the consolidation of the internal market led
the Community to harmonize private law through sectoral directives in
the areas of consumer law. By deepening market integration, the
Commission harmonized contract and tort law as a functional tool for
the completion of the single market. Likewise, jurists addressed
contract law as a technical tool, which was functional to the
Commission’s agenda of realizing an efficient internal market.
In this phase, scholarly projects shared a similar technical approach
to the harmonization of private law. However, methodologically they
oscillated between advocating for the unification of contract law rules,
which was merely functional to the achievement of the internal market,
and adopting a more sophisticated comparative law methodology to
unearth the “common core” of European private law. 157
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union and
expanded Community competences beyond merely economic activities.
This constitutional transformation inaugurated the second phase of the
European private law debate.
Paradoxically, in expanding the
functional capability of the Community, the Commission and the ECJ
showed greater uncertainty about the Community re-regulation resulting
in the decentralization approach of Keck. 158 Towards the end of the
154 See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale
eds., 2000).
155 For the economic constitution approach, see Jürgen Basedow, supra note 142; for the
constitutional asymmetry approach, see Daniela Caruso, supra note 133; for the deliberative
supranationalism approach, see Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the
Realm of Private Law: A Plea for New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L LAW 149
(2004).
156 See Fernanda Nicola & Ugo Mattei, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The
Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 New Eng. L. Rev. 1 (2006). This phase will be
explained in detail in Part IV; however, for Regulatory Competition advocates, see Van den
Bergh, supra note 8.
157 For an insightful analysis of both approaches, see Elena Ioriatti, A Methodological
Approach for a European Restatement of Contract Law, 3 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1 (2003),
available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=gj.
158 See Paul Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE
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1990s, scholars increasingly accused the Community of exceeding its
capacity through a “functional creep.” 159 They often highlighted that
the Commission lacked the competence to regulate private law. 160
In this phase, scholars involved in the Europeanization debate
expressed two major views. On the one hand, some jurists associated
with a neoliberal private law tradition claimed that a European
economic constitution should attempt to harmonize private law. In their
view, an economic constitution, comprising private law rules, would
enhance private autonomy and contractual freedom as well as create
better procedural guarantees for efficient markets. 161 On the other hand,
jurists who claimed that the EU was pervaded by a constitutional
asymmetry urged national lawyers, judges, and politicians to resist the
harmonization of private law. According to these progressive lawyers,
ECJ jurisprudence reflected the free-market bias of the Commission’s
bureaucrats. Both views, despite their opposite political positions,
reinforced the widespread claim that while the European level was
connected to free markets, the national level was connected to social
goals.
This second phase ended with the Tobacco Advertising Judgment
in which the ECJ, for the first time, invalidated a directive because it
lacked a legal basis. 162 This decision produced a shift in consciousness
among jurists because the Commission was successfully challenged by
a Member State. For the first time, it became clear that Communitywide social policies, environmental laws, or a consumer protection
agenda would be challenged by Member States concerned that such
polices encroached on their powers.
The third phase of European private law began in July 2001, when
the Commission published the White paper on European Governance 163
EUROPEAN MARKET 27 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002).
159 See Marchetti & Nicola, supra note 66.
160 See Weatherill, supra note 79.
161 See Jürgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The Making of a
Hybrid, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 35 (2001); Joustra, supra note 109 (discussing the possibilities
of harmonization of national consumer law regimes into European consumer law).
162 In curtailing the action of the Community legislature, the ECJ interpreted EC Treaty art.
95, which allows harmonization of laws only for market functioning measures. In citing an
insufficient connection between the market-building process and the total ban of advertising of
tobacco products, the court considered the directive a disguised public health measure, which the
Community cannot regulate since it falls under the exclusive competence of Member States, as
mandated by EC Treaty art. 152. See Weatherill, supra note 115, at 504 (explaining that in
annulling the Tobacco Advertising Directive, the ECJ reaffirmed that “there is not carte blanche
to harmonize national laws, but rather only a power to achieve defined ends”).
163 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: A WHITE
PAPER, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001).
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and the Green Paper on European Contract Law. 164 In both cases the
Commission sought to involve a larger public, such as academics and
stakeholders, in the process of the re-regulation and harmonization of
contract law. These documents expressed the anxieties surrounding the
democratic accountability of European institutions and highlighted the
need for more effective and transparent regulatory strategies. The
Green Paper signaled that the Commission intended to move ahead with
the harmonization of contract law after triggering wider public debates
and academic involvement. Jurists were now expressly invited by the
Commission to participate in the debate regarding the desirability of
further harmonization of private law, and in its latest document the
European Commission decided to go forward with its project of creating
a sort of restatement for European Contract law. 165
The shift in consciousness produced by these European
transformations triggered some skepticism among lawyers committed to
the economic constitution. Moreover, during this phase jurists began
prominently deploying United States economic analyses. Thus,
Regulatory Competition advocates began arguing in terms that were
radically different from their predecessors. They asserted that diversity
of legal rules, rather than uniformity, was more efficient in achieving a
competitive internal market. In contrast, jurists who had before
opposed the harmonization of contract law began addressing social
justice in European contract law, insisting that the Commission adopt a
distributive justice perspective in the process of the harmonization of
private law. 166
B. Market Functionalism and Uniformity in Contract Law
In 1999, Professors Ole Lando and Hugh Beale published the
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). The so-called Lando
Commission sought to contribute, via PECL, to the unification of
European contract law that had been initiated by the Commission. 167
The Lando principles represented an important model for a uniform
body of contract law and provided a basis for future codification. In
advocating for uniform contract laws, the Lando Commission used a
164
165

See Green Paper, supra note 108.
Karstan & Perti, supra note 118; Dirk Staudenmayer, The Way Forward in European
Contract Law, 2 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 95 (2005).
166 See infra Part V (analyzing the shift of consciousness of European private lawyers and the
reception of United States law and economics).
167 The Lando Principles were inspired by the UNIDROIT Principles for international contract
law adopted in 1994.
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functionalist approach that sought to strengthen the single market by
overcoming the obstacles to trade created by different legal regimes. 168
The PECL approach emphasized private autonomy in contractual
obligations. It gave a central position to the principle of freedom of
contract and elaborated its exceptions through general clauses or
mandatory provisions. 169
PECL is emblematic of the unification of contract law in Europe,
which reflects a broader global trend, namely post-war projects of
harmonization through the creation of a new transnational law for
business regulations. In this spirit, the United Nations General
Assembly in 1962 created the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 170 UNCITRAL’s mission was
to harmonize laws that impeded transnational business transactions.
Through the drafting of international conventions, guidelines, and
model laws, UNCITRAL sought to promote different forms of trade
liberalization that could be adopted in flexible ways by different legal
regimes in order to remove legal obstacles to trade. In the realm of
international contracts, the Vienna Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) has been one of the most used and widely adopted
instruments regulating the sale of goods through international contracts,
even though some countries still refuse to become part of it and some
practitioners have discouraged its adoption. 171
More recently, the work of the International Institute for the
Unification for Private Law (UNIDROIT) has led to the adoption of
various model laws in the realm of international business and
commercial law. 172 In particular, in 1994, UNIDROIT published the
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, which served to
interpret international contract rules in international arbitration
Similar to a
disputes—a sort of restatement of contracts. 173
168 See Schultze, supra note 110; see also Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 110 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick
Munday eds., 2003).
169 See COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW art. 1:102 (1999); see also HESSELINK, supra note 7, at 111−12 (explaining that
the regime of freedom of contract is subject to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing and
other mandatory requirements).
170 See
UNCITRAL,
Origin,
Mandate
and
Composition
of
UNICTRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
171 Luke R. Nottage, Who’s Afraid of the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG)? A New
Zealander’s View from Australia and Japan, 36 VIC. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 815 (2005).
172 See UNIDROIT’s Achievements, www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/achievements.htm
(last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
173 See
UNIDROIT
Principles
of
International
Commercial
Contracts,
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007); see also
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transnational lex mercatoria, at least in the view of some of its most
influential authors, the Principles have been widely used to interpret and
supplement both international uniform law as well as domestic law. 174
In sharp contrast to these unification trends in private law, some
European comparative lawyers departed from the PECL approach and
sought to contribute to European scholarship and legal education by
drawing a map of the similarities and differences emerging in private
law regimes. 175 Compared to PECL, the Common Core Project 176 and
the Casebook Project 177 are methodologically more eclectic in their
attempt to be purely descriptive and therefore to present greater
scientific neutrality. The goal of the Common Core is to create a
cartography of European private law in order to highlight differences
and commonalities emerging among different private law regimes. The
Casebook Project deploys the comparative methodology to shape
European legal education. Through rigorous examination of national
and ECJ case law, the Casebook project aims to introduce civil lawyers
to the analytical aspects of a case-law approach and foster a bottom-up
approach to Europeanization. 178 Both projects undertake an antiformalist exercise in inquiring into the application of legal doctrines. In
assessing the role of the national courts in shaping contract law rules,
they maintain a cautious and at times skeptical approach towards the
Europeanization of contract law. While distancing themselves from the
functionalist approach of the PECL, these European lawyers affirm their
methodological maturity and eclecticism and emphasize their political
neutrality, which leads them to claim of scientific reliability. 179

Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129 (1998) (discussing the use of the
UNIDROIT Principles in arbitration disputes).
174 See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law, 52
UNIFORM
L.
REV.
218
(2002),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm.
175 For this distinction, see Ioriatti, supra note 157.
176 See The Common Core of European Private Law, in 1 PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPEAN
CONTEXT SERIES (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2003).
177 See WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS: TORT LAW
(2000).
178 See Walter Van Gerven, The Case-law of the European Court of Justice and National
Courts as a Contribution to the Europeanization of Private Law, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L, 367,
374-75 (1995).
179 See David Kennedy, The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE
LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONAL AND TRANSITIONS 345, 373 (Pierre Legard & Roderick Munday
eds., 2003).
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C. Diverging Constitutional Views over Europe
The harmonization of contract law contributed to strengthening the
single market by ensuring a level-playing field that enhanced individual
freedoms. In the second phase of the Europeanization process, some
European jurists, supporting the PECL agenda, emphasized that
harmonization of contract law could provide greater information to
private actors and enhance their private autonomy. 180 In supporting the
idea of a European economic constitution, a group of scholars argued in
favor of a European codification, which would guarantee to each person
the disposition of her individual entitlements. For instance, Jürgen
Basedow maintained that the notion of freedom of contract remained
the core idea for a European codification since every person has the
individual right to enter into a binding contract. In his view, European
codification strengthened economic freedoms and counterbalanced the
growing importance of consumer regulation that undermined the basic
values contained in the notion of freedom of contract. 181 For these
lawyers the goal of market harmonization was to remedy the market
failure created by the disparity between commercial and noncommercial contractual regimes, which restricted market competition
and created information asymmetry. 182 These lawyers have tied claims
in favor of European codification to a notion of contract law as a tool
for enhancing party autonomy rather than enhancing social values. 183
These pro-harmonization lawyers have devoted great attention and
support to legislative measures of the Commission. However, they have
highlighted that the Community should be careful not to undermine its
democratic legitimacy, which is grounded in European procedures and,
For instance, the
primarily, national democratic processes. 184
180

See PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET
(Stefan Grundman, Wolfgang Kerber & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2001).
181 See Basedow, supra note 161, at 35−49. The role of contract law “is based upon the
theoretical perception that a promise and the reliance on it is a basic behavior in human society.”
Id. at 38.
182 See Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Contract Law, 4 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L.
505, 518 (2001).
183 See Id.; Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck, An Academic Green Paper on European
Contract Law, in 2 PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT SERIES (Stefan Grundmann & Jules
Stuyck eds., 2002).
184 See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverwfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BverfGE 155 (F.R.G.), translated in 1 C.M.L.R. 57
(1994). But see J.H.H Weiler, The State “über alles:” Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht
Decision (New York School of Law, Working Paper No. 6/95, 1995), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9506ind.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007); see
generally Peter Lindseth, The Maastricht Decision Ten Years Later: Parliamentary Democracy,
Separation of Powers and the Schmittian Interpretation Reconsidered, (European University

NICOLA_ARTICLE_FINAL

144

CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW

5/7/2008 2:23:55 PM

[Vol. NN:000

Community cannot strip European citizens of their individual rights
conferred on them by the Treaty. 185 In casting light on the procedural
guarantees of EC law, they have advocated for a European codification
that supports the functioning of the single market and legislative
discretion by supranational institutions.
Jurists who favored the harmonization of contract law often shared
a common intellectual tradition, which can be traced back to the
Freiburg ordo-liberal school, which also falls under the rubric of 1930s
German neoliberalism. 186 In drawing on the ordo-liberal intellectual
tradition, jurists traced the meaning of concepts such as contractual
freedom to the post-World War II economic compromise of the German
social-market economy. The ordo-liberal tradition offered the European
integration project an influential model of legitimization through the
notion of the “economic constitution.” 187 In relying on the central
tenets of the ordo-liberal tradition, jurists perceived the European
economic constitution enshrined in the Treaty as a means to ensure
greater individual autonomy within the internal market. 188 In arguing in
favor of a European codification, they were attempting to provide a
framework of general contract rules that would ensure equal
possibilities to all players in a free market.
After World War II, as a reaction to totalitarian regimes and
economic collectivism, ordo-liberalism became one of the most
influential schools of thought among political economists and lawyers,
whose views ranged from neoliberal to socially conservative. 189 The
aim of ordo-liberal scholars was to break with a tradition in social
science that was highly influenced by historicism and Marxist
relativism. 190 Ordo-liberals wanted to reassert the role of individual
action in the economic and legal disciplines and to reconcile both
creativity and reason within their work. In their 1936 Manifesto, Frantz
Böhm, Wilhelm Eucken, and Grossman-Doerth asserted that in order to
Institute,
Working
Paper
RSC
No.
2003/18,
2003),
available
at
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/1893/1/03_18.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
185 See Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, On the Legitimacy of European Law, 58 RABELS ZEIT 615
(1994).
186 See VIKTOR J. VANBERG, THE CONSTITUTION OF MARKETS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 37 (2001).
187 Id.
188 See Basedow, supra note 142.
189 See Franz Böhm et al., The Ordo Manifesto of 1936, in GERMANY’S SOCIAL MARKET
ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION (Alan Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989); Dongsheng
Zang, Textualism in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence: Lessons for the Constitutionalization Debate, 33
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 393 (2006).
190 See Böhm, supra note 189.
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protect individual freedom, a polity should have an “economic
constitution” modeled after a “general political decision as to how the
economic life of the nation is to be structured.” 191 The economic
constitution should provide a minimal regulatory framework to avoid
monopolies, ensure the private ownership of the means of production,
and protect individual freedom. In the view of the ordo-liberals, both
efficiency and distributive considerations were relevant for market
correcting purposes and for competition rules, which prevented the
creation of monopolies and the abuse of a dominant position. 192 Within
the ordo-liberal tradition there were two different lines of thought,
which reflect significant differences within the tradition’s economic and
legal approaches. While the early ordo-liberal founders developed a
procedural approach to the economic constitution, the second generation
was largely associated with the social market economy. The founders
of the Freiburg school, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm (whose disciple
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker actively participates in the debate on
European private law), favored a procedural and rule-oriented approach
to law. 193 Their goal was to establish a framework of general rules,
implemented by a centralized and interdependent administrative system,
that would reform the market in an indirect way.194 In contrast, the
second generation of ordo-liberal scholars, such as Alfred MuellerArmack and Wilhelm Röepke, were associated with the notion of a
“social market economy.” 195 Their interventionist economic project
focused on outcome-oriented solutions, including a comprehensive
welfare program, which Kerry Rittich defined as somehow “nostalgic, if
not romantic and utopian, in its orientation.” 196
In this second phase of European private law scholarship, lawyers
were divided between those favoring the harmonization process and
those opposing it. The latter claimed that not only was the Community
decision-maker―namely the Commission, the Council, and the
European Parliament involved in the adoption of Community
Acts―severely constrained from regulating social policy by its
attributed competences, but that the ECJ jurisprudence was pervaded by
a “market holistic” bias. 197 Rather than a liberal interpretation of
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

See id.
KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING 112 (2002).
See Vanberg, supra note 186, at 35.
Id. at 37.
RITTICH, supra note 192, at 112.
Id.
See Alexander Somek, Good News for a Bad Habit: Tobacco, Culture and the Rule of Law
in the European Union (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Harvard Law School for the
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European law, commentators, such as Alexander Somek, explained that
the ECJ jurisprudence was driven by major free market concerns rather
than social ones.
These jurists asserted that while Member States’ regulatory
capacity was limited by the legal constraints set up by the Community,
harmonization of private law was constrained by the single market
rationale. 198 In response to the argument that there was a constitutional
asymmetry in the EU, they advocated for a social and redistributive
notion of contract law, which was embedded in the national private law
regimes that were threatened by the Europeanization of contract law. 199
These jurists opposed the Europeanization process. They advocated for
a “national resistance” 200 against future harmonization by praising the
values intrinsic in the local private law traditions. 201
Jurists who advocated for a welfarist approach to private law and
in favor of distributive justice in contract law argued that contract law
should abandon a procedural conception of justice and move towards a
substantive one. 202 If the notion of procedural justice entailed the
protection of individual rights and market efficiency, they favored a
substantive notion of justice in order to achieve an “acceptable pattern
of welfare” with fair distributive results. 203
According to these lawyers, the Community leit-motif in drafting
consumer protection directives rested on a market efficiency rationale,
which aimed to expand consumer choice. They pointed out that the
Unfair Terms Directive 204 presupposed that buyers were shopping for
their best contractual terms across Member States and assumed that
consumers would be better off through greater competition among
contractual terms. 205 They noted that the Commission assumed that
consumers were actively involved in gathering and using information to
European Law Reading Group), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/elrc/events/20032004/SomekOnPower.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2007); Alexander Somek, From Liberalism to
Holism: Some Observations Regarding the ECJ’s New Theory of Community Competence, 143
JURIDIKUM 6 (2004).
198 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 54−58.
199 See Collins, supra note 7, at 365.
200 See Caruso, supra note 16.
201 See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
52, 60-61 (1996).
202 See Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice Through Contracts, 45 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 49,
51 (1992).
203 See Hugh Collins, Introduction: The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of Contracts,
in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 11
(David Campbell, Hugh Collins & John Wightman eds., 2003).
204 Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29-34 (EEC).
205 GERAINT HOWELLS & THOMAS WILHELMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW (1997).
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make decisions. 206 The Unfair Terms Directive enlisted contract law as
a market-perfecting device through which properly informed consumers
could avoid unfair terms. 207
When explaining the stakes of harmonization, jurists put forward
three different theses that all share a skeptical view on the European
constitutional arrangement: national resistance (Caruso), subsidiarity
(Collins) and cultural difference. 208 The national resistance thesis
focuses on the reactions of national legal regimes to the implementation
of European directives. 209 According to this view, the problem of
harmonization of contract law manifests itself in the implementation of
the directives in the Member States’ legal orders, often represented by
national civil codes. The different outcomes of the implementation of
the Unfair Terms Directive in Italy, Germany, and France revealed not
only the difficulty of harmonizing contract rules but also how little
national contract laws were harmonized in practice. 210 Daniela Caruso
claimed that the Commission’s attempt to reform private law through
directives has actually prompted national legislators and courts to resist
the Europeanization process. 211
The subsidiarity thesis, based on the subsidiarity principle
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, 212 focuses on the social dimension
of contract law as being inherently national and therefore culturally
diverse. Some jurists claimed that contract law could not rely on
206
207

Id. See generally Weatherill, supra note 77, at 57.
See Collins supra note 143, at 237 (explaining that the consumerist movement “has
percolated into the organs of the EC”).
208 See infra notes 209-216.
209 See Caruso, supra note 16.
210 See id. at 24. Daniela Caruso describes how the implementation of the Unfair Contract
Terms Directive encountered resistance from national legislators. In particular, the Products
Liability Directive of 1985 was a big disappointment, as Member States delayed its
implementation. Id.
211 See id.
212 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994) (citing the subsidiarity
principle as explained in revised Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union
(TEU)). The subsidiarity principle states:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive Competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community.
Id. at 346. Bermann’s article analyzes the principle of subsidiarity in reference to procedural
aspects, rather than in light of any substantive criteria that it may offer to officers of the court.
See also Grainne de Burca, Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam (Harvard
Law Sch. Jean Monnet Working Paper Group, Paper No. 7/99, 2000), available at
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.rtf.
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abstract general principles and therefore that Europeanization was not
appropriate in this area. 213 They argued that the Commission should
make greater use of the subsidiarity principle, allowing Member States
to regulate their contract law regimes in different manners. Those
subscribing to the subsidiarity thesis have advanced the view that
national contract law is replete with distributive concerns, which are
now threatened by European market integration. According to this
thesis, Europeanization is a formalist process that suppresses diversity
as an obstacle to free trade, while it undermines the distributive capacity
of national contract law. 214
Some jurists have advanced a third thesis based on the notion of
cultural difference. In valuing the cultural diversity among national
legal regimes, they view the possibilities of the harmonization process
skeptically. Drawing on sociological, 215 cultural, 216 and linguistic 217
insights, these scholars are skeptical of the unification of private law
regimes that occurs more at the level of declamations than at the level of
operative rules. In their view, the harmonization of contract law erases
European identities and offers a troubling systematization of contract
law without attempting to tackle the fragmentation of legal contexts and
the dilemmas of the welfare state. 218 Scholars adopting the cultural
difference thesis generally argue against Europeanization by
characterizing it as a formalist threat to preserving the cultural tradition
inherent in local or national contract law regimes. 219
V. SELECTIVE RECEPTION OF U.S. LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. The Ideological Divide: Receiving Mainstream Law and Economics
In the late 1990s, the debate over European private law became
increasingly politicized. On the one hand, neoliberal scholars began
213 See Hugh Collins, Transaction Costs and Subsidiarity in European Contract Law, in 2
PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPEAN CONTENT SERIES: AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 269 (Stefan Grundman, & Jules Stuyck eds., 2003).
214 See Collins, supra note 143.
215 See Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
216 See Legrand, supra note 201, at 60.
217 See Sacco, supra note 36.
218 See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Welfare State Expectations, Privatisation and Private Law in
FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE
LAW (Thomas Wilhelmsson & Samului Hurri eds., 1999).
219 Pierre Legrand, La leçon d’Apollinaire, in L’HARMONIZATION DU DROIT DES CONTRATS
EN EUROPE 37 (Christophe Jamin & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2001).
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familiarizing themselves with law and economics analyses imported
from the United States while also realizing that Social Europe, in the
realm of private law, was more effective than what they hoped for. 220
On the other hand, social justice advocates, rather than rejecting Europe
tout court, began engaging with European private law by proposing, in
their Social Justice Manifesto, some avenues of reform for the
Commission’s agenda. In this third phase, not only did the views
opposing and in favor of European harmonization change radically, but
most interestingly, democratic legitimacy claims were made by jurists
on the Right and on the Left to criticize ECJ adjudication in a highly
strategic way. While neoliberal jurists influenced by U.S. law and
economics turned against the Europeanization of private law, social
justice advocates turned towards European private law.
In this changing scenario, neoliberal jurists advocated for greater
efficiency of the internal market, but they also started to oppose the
“forced harmonization” of contract law in Europe. 221 While supporting
greater diversity among private law regimes rather than harmonization
projects, these neoliberal scholars justified diversity of national contract
laws by the subsidiarity principle. Roger Van den Bergh affirmed that
Member States should resist the harmonization process because
diversity of contractual regimes improved efficiency within the single
market. 222 According to this view, the application of the subsidiarity
principle could enhance regulatory competition, reduce transaction
costs, and satisfy preferences―thus maximizing market efficiency. 223
In adopting United States mainstream law and economics insights,
neoliberal jurists attacked welfare provisions contained in European
directives. 224 They deployed public choice rationales to undermine the
goals of the Unfair Terms Directive, which they claimed “may cause
inefficiencies rather then curing them.” 225 In drawing on law and
economic insights, they argued that although the Directive aimed to
220
221
222
223

See supra Part IIC (discussing reactions to the ECJ Simone Leitner case).
See Van den Bergh, supra note 8, at 254.
See Bermann, supra note 212 (discussing the subsidiarity principle of EC Treaty art. 5).
See Roger Van den Bergh, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Community Law: Some
Insights from Law and Economics; 1:4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 337, 339 (1994).
224 For a definition of United States mainstream law and economics, see Duncan Kennedy,
supra note 179. For a definition of the same as it pertains European private law, see Roberto
Pardolesi, Clausole Abusive, Pardon Vessatorie: Verso L’attuazione di una Direttiva Abusata,
CARDOZO ELECTRONIC L. BULL. (1995), http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/home.html
(attacking the unfair contract terms directive). For a more recent approach, see ANTONIO
CUCINOTTA, ROBERTO PARDOLESI & ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS
ON ANTITRUST LAW (2002).
225 See Van den Bergh, supra note 8, at 261.
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protect consumers against unfairness, in reality it created potential
inefficiencies, causing negative welfare implications. 226
In receiving United States mainstream law and economics theories,
European jurists began associating institutional competence arguments
(courts versus legislatures) with substantive values (efficiency versus
distribution). For instance, in criticizing the institutional changes
triggered by the Unfair Terms Directive, they deployed Mitchell
Polinsky’s view to argue that the increased discretion of judges to
decide the unfairness of the terms would limit the autonomy of private
parties to achieve an efficient solution. 227 They claimed that since
efficiency provides objectivity, this is a “technical everyday problem
solving” tool that keeps “political disagreements outside the core” of
scholarly fields. 228 According to these jurists, distribution concerns,
which are inherently political and subjective, should remain outside of
both the sphere of judicial interpretation and the scholarly analysis of
lawyers. When contributing to the European private law debate, they
argued that the interpretation of directives by courts should be guided
by efficiency goals instead of distributive considerations. Thus, while
the ECJ could legitimately address efficiency considerations,
distributive concerns should be left to Member State legislatures.
In selectively adopting US law and economics, European scholars
advocated for minimal state intervention in private transactions,
allowing pockets of public regulation as long as these ensured free and
competitive market places. 229 They claimed that, instead of benefiting
consumers, welfarist legislations backfired and hurt the people the
legislations were trying to help. In fact, by increasing the prices of
consumer goods, sellers could easily pass on the costs of a warranty to
the consumers. In this way, some of the beneficiaries of the warranty
would be driven out of the market.
In addressing compulsory terms, which performed an insurancelike function for buyers, US mainstream law and economics scholars
argued that they created inefficient outcomes by diminishing overall
consumer welfare by increasing prices. The warranty undermined the
226 Peter Van Wijck & Jules Theeuwes, Protection Against Unfair Contracts: An Economic
Analysis of European Regulation, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON.73 (2000).
227 See Pardolesi, supra note 224.
228 See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (1997).
229 See Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the
Lens of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 25, 30-31 (F.H.
Buckley ed., 1999) (stating that laissez-faire makes “explicit substantive judgments about which
kind of regulations work in the common interest and which do not; . . . its practical side stresses
the bad consequences to civil society that flow from ambitious government regimes of taxation
and regulation that violate its precepts”).

NICOLA_ARTICLE_FINAL

5/7/2008 2:23:55 PM

200X] TRANSATLANTICISM IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 151
goal of reducing transaction costs through contracts of adhesion and
made marginal groups of consumers worse off because they were priced
out of the market. Thus, compulsory warranties in consumer contracts
“run[] counter to prevailing redistributive rationales” by creating nonoptimal market results. 230
Chicago legal economists explained that when buyers are free to
choose any contractual term they will benefit from market competition
and will choose the most efficient term for their transaction. 231
Regulation of consumer contracts through judicial or legislative
intervention, such as the unconscionability doctrine or compulsory
warranties, will diminish the overall market efficiency. First, equity
doctrines allow judges to deploy the unequal bargaining power rhetoric,
which is not a “fruitful, or even meaningful” criterion to assess legal
consequences. 232 Second, courts are “institutionally incapable of
choosing the defining values and finding the relevant facts” in order to
determine equity considerations. 233 Third, private regulation made by
markets is more efficient than judicial intervention based on fairness,
since the former accurately reflects the aggregate preference of
buyers. 234
230 Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Non-Substantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV.
1053, 1062 (1977).
The efficiency of a standardized contract lies in its internal construction—once the seller preestablishes the terms of the contract and the consumer is presented with a ‘take it or leave it’
agreement. Both buyer and seller thereby avoid further transaction costs of negotiating individual
agreements while a legal rule restricting the enforceability of standardized contracts creates large
efficiency loss.
231 See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 61-78 (1969).
Posner not only critiques the inefficiency of FTC regulation that is unable to protect consumers,
but he also claims that “administrative enforcement of antifraud principles has no comparative
advantage procedurally or institutionally, over judicial” enforcement. Id. at 67.
232 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 87 (2d ed. 1977).
233 Alan Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and The Judicial Process 49 IND. L.J.
367, 367-368 (1974). To assess whether buyers in a given transaction do or do not have unequal
bargaining power, courts have the impossible task of determining, in relation to the market and to
the choice of terms offered to buyers at different prices, if the given term of a contract is fair or
not. In Schwartz’s view, courts do not have standard criteria to strike down a clause because it
required an excessive price. Moreover, judges use two sets of non-convincing arguments: (1) the
term can be void because it produces effects that are inconsistent with the policies that the court
enforces, and (2) the term can be void because the seller’s power produced that term. Id. at 368.
234 See id. at 380 Schwartz uses the consumer sovereignty rhetoric even when buyers
negotiate for terms with a monopolist. He states, “these buyers may still, in the aggregate, choose
the contract clauses which monopolists offer. Those choices are more likely to reflect their own
preferences than the choices courts would make for them.” See also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 86-129 (5th ed. 1998). Posner offers an alternative
interpretation of the Thomas Walker Furniture case, suggesting that the seller’s right of
repossession was an efficient way to allow consumers to purchase the goods in advance.
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Even more significantly, European scholars adopted what U.S.
mainstream legal economists referred to as “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency” as
the objective guiding principle that would drive decisions of both
legislators and judges. While the Pareto-superiority criterion did not
favor those rules, which cannot make both buyers and sellers better off,
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion allows choosing a rule even if only the seller
is better off, as long as the seller’s gain exceeds the buyer’s losses. The
seller would then theoretically be able to compensate the buyer. Even
when the choice of a determined rule justified by a Kaldor-Hicks
criterion creates actual losers, the rule is the most efficient one, since as
Posner puts it “the winners could compensate the losers, whether or not
they actually do.” 235
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion refers to the relationship between the
aggregate benefits and the aggregate costs of a situation, thus referring
to the “size of the pie”‘ and its overall maximization. The attractiveness
of this criterion, which mainstream legal economists presented as an
objective one, is that everyone can be better off if society is organized
in an efficient manner. In dismissing the distributive consequences of
the efficient solution and depicting society as an aggregate of individual
well being, mainstream legal economists deployed Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency as a neutral and non-political criterion. In allowing this
trade-off between ‘efficiency’ and ‘distribution’ of resources, because
of the beneficial increase in aggregate wealth, mainstream legal
economists set aside more political and costly distributive choices.
Mainstream legal economists put forward a consistent institutional
competence argument according to which judges should pursue KaldorHicks efficiency while they should set aside distributive goals in
adjudication. According to them, it is difficult or impossible to
redistribute through legal rules, and legislatures only have the
competence to deal with distribution of resources. In their view,
legislatures rather than courts are institutionally capable of deciding
distributive questions. By means of the government’s tax and transfer
systems, legislative decisions are likely to be more precise than the
decision of a random judge. 236 Due to high administrative costs of the
235

See RICHARD POSNER, supra note 232, at 518:
The use of liability rules or other legal sanctions to redistribute income from wealthy
to poor is likely to miscarry. A rule of liability is like an exercise tax: it induces a
contraction in output and increases price. However, the part made liable may be able
to shift much of the liability cost on the poor through prices. The result is a
capricious redistribution of income and wealth within the class of poor people
themselves and an overall reduction in their welfare.
236 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 4 (1999) (“Economists
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legal system, mainstream legal economists advocate that legislatures are
not only the most apt but also the most efficient institutions to decide
distributional issues. 237
B. Resisting law and Economics: Social Justice in European Contract
Law
From a different ideological perspective, jurists advocating for
social justice in European private law drafted a manifesto in 2004 to
address democratic concerns regarding the harmonization process.238
The Social Justice Manifesto focuses on the need to secure legitimacy,
namely democratic acceptance of the socio-economic values embedded
in the harmonization of private law. In advocating for greater social
justice and legitimacy in European contract law, the Manifesto stresses
the importance of preserving cultural and local diversity that allows
“variation, experimentation and innovation.” 239 In short, the Manifesto
aims to tie the European notion of a social market economy together
with regulatory legitimacy in order to overcome the troubling
democratic deficit in the EU. 240
In following a well-known social tradition in contract law, social
justice advocates state that the new European legal culture offers a
possibility to depart from legal formalism, allowing for a more
contextualized and open dialogue about the political stakes of European

understand how laws affect the distribution of income and wealth across classes and groups and
while they often recommend changes that increase efficiency, they try to avoid taking sides in
disputes about distribution, usually leaving recommendations about distribution to policy-makers
or voter.”).
237 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10, 125 (2d
ed. 1989) (arguing that “[i]t is often impossible to redistribute income through the choice of legal
rules and even when it’s possible redistribution through government tax and transfer system may
be cheaper and is likely to be more precise” so that “redistribution through legal rules is costly,
not precise for income groups purposes and it only takes place when a dispute happens, not on a
consistent base”). For a more recent approach, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 31−35 (2002).
238 See Hugh Collins, Editorial, The Future of European Private Law: An Introduction, 10
EUR. L.J. 649 (2004).
239 See Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in European
Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653, 672 (2004) [hereinafter Social Justice Manifesto].
240 Collins, supra note 238, at 650:
The institutions of the European Union, with their unique constellation of multilevel
systems of governance, are not designed, and were never intended to be competent,
to engage in the construction of such a political settlement. If Europe is to embark
on this process of general harmonization of laws, it should not start from here, that is
the current processes for enacting legislation, because those processes lack the
necessary legitimacy to engage with these fundamental political questions.
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integration. 241 These scholars explain that the problem with the
harmonization of private law arises when national fairness standards are
replaced by a much narrower conception of the principle of social
justice than the one existing at the national level. They fear that such
replacement is likely to occur in order to secure the effective realization
of European regulation.
Rather than a technocratic enterprise based on neutral principles
such as freedom of contract, social justice advocates in their Manifesto
envisage European contract law as a set of doctrinal rules chosen to
advance fairness and distributive justice. 242 They emphasize that the
harmonization of contract law needs to be understood as part of
European multi-level governance that creates political consequences for
citizens of the Union and not merely as a functional tool for the
completion of the internal market. In opposing a technocratic approach
to harmonization, they depart from those progressive views suggesting
tout court the need to resist harmonization of contract law because the
European level is pervaded by constitutional asymmetry. In contrast,
they side with the slogan “Hard Code now!” 243
Thus social justice advocates claim that unification of private law
should proceed as part of the political evolution to construct the
European Union. The Commission should address socio-economic
values more openly and democratically through “new methods for the
construction of this union of shared fundamental values (which include
respect for cultural diversity) as represented in the law of contract and
the remainder of private law.” 244 They state,
Unless a more democratic and accountable process is initiated, there
is a clear danger that these fundamental issues will never be openly
addressed, and a serious risk that powerful interest groups will be
able to manipulate the technocratic process behind the scenes in
order to secure their interests at the expense of the welfare of
ordinary citizens. 245

In embracing the view that the European Union is pervaded by an
asymmetry when it comes to social justice, these scholars claim, “The
values of negative integration and competition were never intended to
241

See MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 72 (2001); Robert W.
Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985
WISC. L. REV. 565 (1985).
242 See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999).
243 See Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1:1 (2002) (arguing that a
European Code will benefit consumers, but that soft law measures would advance corporate
interests).
244 Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 239, at 657.
245 Id. at 658.
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provide an exhaustive scheme of social justice for a market order. They
should not be used now as the exclusive determinative foundations for a
consensus of values underpinning European contract law.” 246
In considering the distributive consequences of contract law, the
Manifesto provides no answer to neoliberal critics for which social
legislation is highly inefficient because it passes on the costs of
protections. Neoliberals argue that when the distribution of wealth
happens through cross-subsidies among differently situated groups of
buyers these “are prima facie unjustifiable.” 247
The second idea of the Manifesto is that the constitutionalization of
private law provides the opportunity to give a concrete expression to
individual rights protected by the European Convention of Human
Rights and to the social and economic rights recognized by the Nice
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 248 However,
the constitutionalization approach of the Manifesto recognizes social
rights only to European citizens. Immigrants, or socially marginalized
individuals who are excluded from the possibility of concluding
contracts, will not enjoy European social rights.
C. The Distributive Analysis: A Limited Reception
In response to the attacks of Chicago legal economists to welfare
regulation by administrative agencies and courts, some United States
jurists developed a distributive analysis of legal rules as an alternative
law and economics theory. In deploying a law and economics
methodology, these progressive scholars began writing in the 1970s, but
it was not until the 1990s that European jurists became aware of the
distributive analysis.
One could trace the distributive analysis back to an article by
Arthur Leff, which demonstrated how the legal process creates high
transaction costs that are unequally distributed among litigants,
especially between business and consumers. 249 The following year,
246
247

Id. at 667.
Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in
Private Law, in THE POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 9 (Martin W. Hesselink ed., 2006).
248 See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 239, at 667.
249 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 337-38 (1st ed. 1973) (claiming
that three factors can affect the decision to settle rather than litigate: “the relative cost of litigation
and settlement, the parties’ attitude toward risk and differences between the parties’ judgment of
the likely outcome of litigation”). See also Arthur A Leff, Injury, Ignorance, Spite—The
Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1970). Leff engages with the law and
economics methodology by offering four reasons for the costs of due process:
First, due process demands that at the outset the court and its officers be wholly
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Bruce Ackerman’s response to the attack by Chicago legal economists
against welfare regulation elaborated an economic model to justify the
enforcement of housing codes as a means to rectify inequalities in
wealth distribution. 250 In response to the argument that the cost of
social legislation is passed on to the poor he elaborated an economic
model that showed the contrary. An effective and comprehensive
housing code could, under certain conditions, redistribute income from
landlords to tenants. 251
In the 1980s, scholars shifted their attention from administrative
regulation to private law rules because housing codes were no longer a
viable option under the current administration. Duncan Kennedy
applied Ackerman’s economic model to justify the use of compulsory
terms in contract and tort rules. Despite the attempt by sellers to pass
on the costs of the mandatory term to buyers, their effectiveness
depended on the shape of supply and demand curves and the
competitive structure of the market. By disaggregating the group of
buyers in at least four sub-groups, in relation to their utility and risk
preferences, the introduction of an insurance-like term had distributive
consequences “possibly, not necessarily including enriching part of the
buyer group at the expense of other buyers and sellers.” 252
In following the compulsory terms analysis, Richard Craswell
demonstrated that the benefit of a warranty in consumer contracts is
“inversely related to sellers’ ability to pass on their costs.” 253 In
rejecting the indeterminacy of the passing-on-the-cost argument, he
showed that distributive gains were perceived, not by an increase in
price, but through the willingness to pay of marginal consumers. 254

ignorant of what happened and it is expensive to educate them, at least using the
pleading-and-playlet format of the common law. Second, the process of education
cannot proceed on a generalized (mass produced) basis; each case is theoretically
hand-crafted. Third, save in a court of small claims it is usually specialists (e.g.,
lawyers) who do the crafting. Fourth, because the courts do not allocate docket
space by competitive bidding between plaintiffs, the creditor with the largest claim
at stake must take his place in a “queue” behind plaintiffs with smaller claims.
250 See Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971).
251 See id. at 1111.
252 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563
app. B at 654 (1982).
253 See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991).
254 See id. (“If sellers can pass on much of the costs of a rule, this usually indicates that
consumers benefit a good deal from the rule. If sellers cannot pass on very much of their costs,
the rule has probably made their product less attractive to consumers.”).
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More recent applications have analyzed the favorable consequences of
welfare regulations for specific groups of workers through
accommodation mandates 255 and particular debtors through the
imposition of compulsory terms protecting mortgagors. 256
One of the most important receptions of the distributive analysis in
European scholarship can be traced to Hugh Collins’s work in the
1990s. In response to European lawyers engaging with mainstream law
and economics, 257 Collins addressed the regulation of contractual
unfairness and the costs of effective welfare regulation. In examining
the Unfair Terms Directive, he emphasized that consumers are unlikely
to litigate the term before a court; thus the Directive has little impact on
the use and content of adhesion contracts. Moreover, according to
Collins, the Directive suffered “the weakness of creating an
unsophisticated framework for enquiry” 258 in which the judge lacks
information to police a particular clause because of insufficient
information about the market conditions, the particular quality of the
product, and the business conditions to supply it. In attacking the “open
texture rules” or general clauses to police unfairness, Collins claimed
that they favor businesses rather than consumers since such rules
require judges to contextualize the legal framework. 259 Collins asserted
that private law regulation cannot improve contractual fairness by open
texture rules, but instead should do so through higher formal standards.
For instance, the Unfair Terms Directive set up a black list of unfair
terms, which are to be immediately voided by judges. 260 Moreover,
through an examination of empirical models, Collins convincingly
argued that there are markets in which the price of welfare regulation,
such as minimum wages or compulsory duties of disclosure, cannot be
passed on to the protected group. 261 In these cases regulating unfairness
produces the desired redistributive results, and formal standards or

255 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000). In demonstrating
that favourable distributive effects are assured for certain accommodated groups, Jolls provides a
counterpoint to the existing literature, which assumes that desirable effects for accommodated
workers are unlikely to happen because costs will be shifted to the accommodated group in the
form of reduced wages or reduced employment.
256 See Duncan Kennedy, The Ex-Post Distributive Case for Insurance Like Compulsory
Terms in Consumer Contracts (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
257 See COLLINS, supra note 242.
258 Id. at 233.
259 See Hugh Collins, Formalism and Efficiency: Designing European Commercial Law, 8
Eur. Rev. Private L. 211 (2000).
260 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, art. 3(3), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EEC) (addressing the
Unfair Terms Directive’s “indicative” but “non-exhaustive” list of terms that “may” be unfair).
261 See COLLINS, supra note 242, at 286.
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compulsory terms produce a better regulatory outcome than open
texture rules such as good faith or other general clauses.
The reception of the distributive analysis in European legal thought
was limited to those progressive scholars addressing consumer
regulations and, tangentially, European private law. 262 Scholars have
not yet elaborated a response, aiming to show desirable economic
effects of welfarist regulations for determinate groups of buyers,
debtors, or workers, to counter the attacks against social welfare
regulation by jurists who support regulatory competition for European
contract law. 263
An example of a regulatory effort that, while highly criticized by
scholars, has not been subject to any form of meaningful scrutiny is the
Directive harmonizing the law of consumer sales and warranties. 264
Adopted by the Council in 1999 after a long and difficult struggle
between conflicting political and economic interests, the Directive is an
outstanding example of how European scholarship fails to address the
distributive consequences of Community re-regulation. Aimed at
improving the functioning of the internal market, the Directive
harmonizes guarantee regimes in consumer sales. 265
Under this Sales-Warranties Directive, sellers must warrant the
conformity (merchantability) of their goods for at least two years
following the delivery to the consumer. If a good lacks conformity, the
remedies available to the consumer are repair and replacement of the
good and, in the alternative, price reduction and rescission of the
contract. 266 Member States have the possibility of introducing an
obligation for consumers to inform the seller of the defect within a
flexible notification period of at least two months. 267 The Directive
requires that if the guarantee under national laws has a limitation period,
262 See id.; see also GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT (Roger Brownsword,
Norma J. Hird, & Geraint Howells eds., 1999); Leone Niglia, Standard Form Contracts in
Europe and North America: One Hundred Years of Unfair Terms?, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE 101, 127 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Thomas
G.W. Telfer eds., 2003).
263 See Stuyck, supra note 64.
264 See Council Directive 1999/44/EC, On Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods
and Associated Guarantees, 1999 O.J., (L 171/12) (EC) (hereinafter Sales-Warranties Directive).
265 See id. art. 1(2)(e). According to the definitions, a guarantee
shall mean any undertaking by a seller or producer to the consumer, given without
extra charge, to reimburse the price paid or to replace, repair or handle consumer
goods in any way if they do not meet the specifications set out in the guarantee
statement or in the relevant advertising.
266 Id. art. 3-5.
267 See id. art. 5(2) and for used goods art. 7(1). Art. 7(1) states that the period should be no
less than one year, and both provisions allow Member States to enact more stringent provisions.
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this time period cannot be less than two years from the day of delivery.
In that case the directive places consumers in a more advantageous
position than under several national laws. 268
Some jurists have criticized this measure as a paternalistic
intervention, imposing a compulsory warranty that harms consumers
instead of protecting them. By overestimating the risks for consumers,
the introduction of the compulsory warranty forces sellers to pass on the
cost of the term to consumers. Thus, the mandatory warranties will
increase prices of goods while also stimulating alternative solutions to
circumvent the compulsory term. For instance, after the adoption of the
Directive, Germany imposed a mandatory liability for used cars of at
least one year. Scholars argue that this regulation has increased market
prices for used cars, while creating incentives for lawyers to circumvent
the compulsory warranty. In light of these assumptions, they suggest
that a more sound solution would have left it up to private parties to
negotiate conditions of a warranty for non-conformity. Rather than
adopting an ex-ante perspective by imposing the mandatory warranty,
they suggest that in the case of a violation of contractual good faith,
national courts could enforce ex-post the Unfair Terms Directive. 269
In response to such claim, a distributive analysis of the German
market of used cars could show how the ‘passing-on-the-cost’ argument
is highly indeterminate, and that the argument that consumers benefit
from a mandatory rule only when sellers cannot pass on the cost of the
warranty is misleading. For instance, a distributive analysis of the
effect of the warranty in this case could demonstrate whether the value
of the good offered in the market after the imposition of the compulsory
term is underestimated by marginal consumers. Through cross
subsidization among marginal and infra-marginal consumers, some
buyers will fully benefit from a compulsory warranty “only when sellers
are able to pass on a large share of their costs.” 270 Consequently, jurists
should argue whether the compulsory warranty creates more or less
consumer welfare without relying on the consumers’ willingness to pay,
which is a highly indeterminate criterion.
If by imposing a compulsory warranty the Sales-Warranties
268

See id. art. 5:
The seller shall be held liable under Article 3 where the lack of conformity becomes
apparent within two years as from delivery of the goods. If, under national
legislation, the rights laid down in Article 3(2) are subject to a limitation period, that
period shall not expire within a period of two years from the time of delivery.
269 See Gerhard Wagner, The Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law, 39
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 995, 1020 (2002).
270 See Craswell, supra note 253, at 361.
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Directive favors certain consumers because it burdens the sellers with
the cost of the information about the risk of the products, one should
still assess how redistribution plays out, not necessarily among buyers
and sellers, but between different groups of buyers. In Craswell’s
analysis of consumer contracts, buyers might end up benefiting from the
mandatory guarantee, but their willingness to pay varies in a way that is
not related to the warranty’s true benefits. In order to determine
whether consumer welfare increases, one should address the
“relationship between the warranty’s true benefits and the marginal
consumer willingness to pay for the warranty” rather than the sheer
price increase. 271 In the case of second hand cars in Germany, jurists
should verify which groups of consumers are benefiting from the
warranty and how redistribution takes place in that market. By means
of this analysis scholars could respond to the ‘passing-on-the-cost’
claim by showing that consumers are willing to pay for a product,
namely the used car plus the guarantee, that they would not get from the
market without the regulatory intervention of the Directive. 272
According to social justice advocates, the ECJ is institutionally
constrained to address efficiency consideration because of a
constitutional asymmetry pervading the EU. Ultimately, these jurists
argue that judges, and European judges in particular, cannot be fully
trusted to promote social justice. 273 This idea is based on the view that
substantive and social justice concepts should pass through legislatures,
as they reflect the democratic consensus, whereas one should be
skeptical of judges because of their elitist or passive take on such
concepts.
This part demonstrated that neoliberal advocates have deployed
United States law and economics theories to limit the harmonization of
private law rules. In contrast, social justice advocates have resisted the
reception of United States law and economics to argue in favor of
harmonized rules. However, both groups deploy similar institutional
competence claims, and they have strategically deployed constitutional
asymmetry claims to criticize ECJ adjudication and to delegitimate
European and national courts at the benefit of Community or national
legislatures.
As a result, European jurists on both sides of the political spectrum
have not yet engaged with the distributive consequences of private law
rules. In particular, when European courts rather than national
271
272
273

Id. at 391.
See Kennedy, supra note 252.
See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 239.
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legislatures determine private law rules, European jurists tend to
collapse institutional competence arguments with substantial ones rather
than assessing their distributive consequences.
This article showed that even if some jurists have welcomed―and
others have resisted―the virtual transplant of United States legal
thought for a variety of legal, socio-economic, and historical reasons, at
the operational level both groups recurrently adopt constitutional
asymmetry claims in ways that constrain the debate on European private
law to a pair of stifled positions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently, lawyers, scholars, and judges have changed their claims
towards European private law, and this change has taken place in the
broader context of a transatlantic dialogue between European and U.S.
lawyers and scholars. This article demonstrates that despite a recurrent
claim made by European private lawyers that there is a constitutional
asymmetry in the EU, in the last decade such a claim has lost its appeal.
While a deeper understanding of European integration has required
lawyers to pay greater attention to ECJ jurisprudence, others lawyers
have engaged in the bigger enterprise of elaborating new ideas and
receiving new legal theories that could better inform them in how to
approach the harmonization of legal rules. Primarily, European lawyers
have shifted the focus of their analysis from democratic legitimacy
concerns to substantive concerns by addressing the consequences of
legal rules. This change in part explains the current emphasis of the
European Commission on modernizing rather than drafting new
regulations and the important role played by legal scholars in advising
and legitimizing the work of the Commission. 274 Moreover, the
selective reception of United States law and economics has induced
lawyers to partly reject the harmonization of legal rules in favor of
regulatory competition models. Finally, the creation of a wellestablished group of European private law academics, with a large
number of publications in this field, has enriched the debate and has
demonstrated how the field is increasingly ideologically and politically
divided. 275
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See Green Paper, supra note 108.
See Mattei & Nicola, supra note 156.

